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ARTICLES 
THE GATHERING TWILIGHT? 
INFORMATION PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET IN THE POST-
ENLIGHTENMENT ERA 
MARK F. KIGHTLINGER 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The steady stream of news reports about violations of privacy on the 
Internet! has spawned a growing body of literature discussing the legal 
protections available for personally identifiable information ("PH") - i.e., 
information about identified or identifiable persons - collected via the 
Internet. 2 Much of this literature focuses, not surprisingly, on whether 
we need legal protection for such PH and, if so, how much. Should we 
have more regulation or less, more government oversight or less? This 
1. On August 14, 2006, a search via http://news.google.com detected 151 news stories 
containing the terms "Internet," "privacy," and ''violation" posted between July 11 and Au-
gust 12, 2006. There is no reason to believe that this represents an unusual number of 
stories for a one-month period. 
2. This voluminous literature includes Fred H. Cate, Commentary, Principles of In· 
ternet Privacy, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 877 (2000); Catherine Crump, Student Author, Data Reten· 
tion: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accountability Online, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 191 (2003); A. 
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461 (2000); Oscar H. Gandy, 
Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in 
Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 77 (1996); Karim Jamal, Michael Maier & Shyam Sun-
der, Enforced Standards Versus Evolution by General Acceptance: A Comparative Study of 
E-Commerce Privacy Disclosure and Practice in the U.S. and the U.K (AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 03-8, July 2003); Jerry Kang, Information 
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, The 
Architecture of Privacy, 1 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 56 (1999); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to 
the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway 
Technology of the Future, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 27 (1995); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 815 (2000); Rachel K Zimmer-
man, The Way the 'Cookies' Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty-
First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy 439 (2000-2001). 
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Article takes the discussion of Internet privacy protection in a new and 
very different direction by reexamining the U.S. Internet privacy regime 
from the perspective of a broader culturallhistorical analysis and cri-
tique. The perspective adopted is that of Alasdair MacIntyre's account of 
the disarray in Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment discourse about 
morality and human nature and the accompanying disappearance of ra-
tional justifications for decisions and institutions grounded in that 
discourse. 
MacIntyre has argued that during and after the Enlightenment, 
thinkers in many different fields agreed on the need to replace the domi-
nant classical and medieval paradigm for explaining and justifying 
human action.3 That paradigm had centered on an understanding of 
human nature as teleological - i.e., directed toward a supreme human 
end or good, a telos.4 With the rejection of the old paradigm, a new para-
digm gradually emerged that characterizes the human being first of all 
as an individual pursuing his or her own interests in light of his or her 
own values.5 Central to this new paradigm are the related notions that 
individuals characteristically interact with one another and pursue their 
interests in a market, and that to ensure the market will function prop-
erly and coordinate individual interests, bureaucratic oversight of vari-
ous kinds is required.6 The first objective of this Article is to show how 
the U.S. Internet privacy regime reflects and reinforces this post-En-
lightenment paradigm. The second objective is to show how the regime 
reveals some of the limitations of that paradigm. 
Identifying a paradigm and its limitations is not the same as over-
throwing or replacing a paradigm. Indeed, an important characteristic 
of any paradigm is that it guides the way thoughtful people see and un-
derstand the field to which it applies. Thomas Kuhn remarked that 
"[u]ntil [the] scholastic paradigm was invented, there were not pendu-
lums, but only swinging stones for the scientist to see. Pendulums were 
brought into existence by something very like a paradigm-induced ge-
stalt switch."7 Thus, ifthe thesis that the U.S. regime reflects and rein-
forces a modern paradigm is correct or at least defensible, then that 
regime also will reflect the way we - or a great many of us - normally see 
and understand the world. Persuading people to replace the regime with 
3. Infra nn. 17-19 and accompanying text. 
4. !infra n. 13 and accompanying text. 
5. Infra nn. 28-30 and accompanying text. 
6. Infra nn. 38-49 and accompanying text. 
7. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 120 (2d ed., U. Chi. Press 
1970) [hereinafter Kuhn, Structurel. See also Thomas S. Kuhn, Possible Worlds in History 
of Science, in The Road Since Structure 58, 87-88 (James Conant & John Haugeland eds., 
U. Chi. Press 2000) (expressing doubts about the applicability to groups rather than indi-
viduals of his earlier remarks concerning gestalt shifts). 
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something fundamentally different probably would require displacing 
the dominant paradigm and thereby changing the way that people see 
the world. That task is beyond the scope of this Article. Thus, readers 
seeking yet another proposal for reforming U.S. privacy law should look 
elsewhere. Admittedly, at a number of points in this Article it is sug-
gested that the older teleological paradigm of human nature and moral 
life may have some continuing vitality. But this Article does not claim to 
take on the larger project of defending the old paradigm or a revised ver-
sion ofit.B Rather, references to the enduring worth of the old paradigm 
are intended to sensitize the reader's imagination to other quite different 
ways of seeing the world and our place in it. 
The argument of this Article proceeds in four stages. Section II 
briefly outlines the transition from the older paradigm to the modern, 
post-Enlightenment paradigm, drawing heavily on Alasdair MacIntyre's 
account of the relationships among the individual, the market, and the 
administrative state. Section III explicates the legal principles of the 
U.S. Internet privacy regime. Section IV sets those legal principles in a 
broader context of legal theories concerning the administrative state, 
drawing in particular on the work of Robert Rabin and other scholars in 
the field of administrative law. Finally, Section V argues that the U.S. 
Internet privacy regime reflects and reinforces key tenets of the post-
Enlightenment paradigm. In particular, the regime emphasizes protect-
ing the individual who competes in a market and empowering imper-
sonal bureaucratic authority as the guarantor of the individual's privacy. 
II. MACINTYRE'S ACCOUNT OF THE POST-
ENLIGHTENMENT PARADIGM 
In a series of books and articles published since 1980, Alasdair 
MacIntyre has developed an account of the emergence and troubled his-
tory of what this Article refers to as the post-Enlightenment paradigm9 
8. For a relatively brief and accessible defense of Aristotelian moral theory, see Alas-
dair MacIntyre, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods, in The 
MacIntyre Reader 136 (Kelvin Knight ed., Polity Press 1998). 
9. The discussion of paradigms in this article relies heavily on the work of Thomas 
Kuhn. See Kuhn, Structure, supra n. 7, at 43-51, 174-191. Although Kuhn used the term 
"paradigm" in several different ways, he ultimately emphasized two core meanings. "On 
the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element 
in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, 
can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science." Id. at 175. "Paradigm" is used in this article exclusively in the first sense. It is 
worth noting that Kuhn attempted to re-label such a constellation of beliefs the "discipli-
nary matrix," Id. at 182, and to restrict the term "paradigm" to "exemplars," which are "the 
concrete problem-solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific educa-
tion .... " Id. at 187. In addition to being cumbersome, however, the phrase "disciplinary 
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for understanding morality and human nature.lO It is impossible in a 
short summary to capture the breadth and richness of MacIntyre's philo-
sophical and historical arguments,l1 but the core of his position can be 
stated succinctly. Drawing on a ground-breaking analysis of moral lan-
guage by Elizabeth Anscombe,12 MacIntyre contends that the dominant 
tradition of ethical reflection running from Aristotle through Thomas 
Aquinas accepted as a basic tenet a three-part teleological account of 
human nature and human action. 
Within that teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast be-
tween man -as-he-happens-to-be and man -as-he-could -be-if-he-realized-
his-essential-nature. Ethics is the science which is to enable men to 
understand how they make the transition from the former state to the 
latter .... The precepts which enjoin the various virtues and prohibit 
the vices which are their counterparts instruct us how to move from 
matrix" is overly narrow because it presumes that a paradigm is "the common possession of 
the practitioners of a particular discipline." Id. at 182. This article presumes that a para-
digm can become a much broader cultural "possession" that governs, or at least profoundly 
influences, the ways in which thoughtful people ordinarily understand the world. See also 
Thomas S. Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms, in The Essential Tension: Selected Stud-
ies in Scientific Tradition and Change 293, 297, 318-319 (U. Chi. Press 1977). In a later 
work Kuhn recast the disciplinary matrix as the "lexical taxonomy" or "conceptual scheme." 
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Road Since Structure, in The Road Since Structure 90, 94 (James 
Conant & John Haugeland eds., U. Chi. Press 2000). Cf Thomas S. Kuhn, The Natural 
and Human Sciences, in The Road Since Structure 216, 221 (James Conant & John Hauge-
land eds., U. Chi. Press 2000) (suggesting "hermeneutic basis" as a replacement for "para-
digm."). For early critical comments on Kuhn's work, see Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave, 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (lmre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., Cambridge 
U. Press 1970). For Alasdair MacIntyre's critical reformulation of Kuhn's account of scien-
tific revolutions, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and 
the Philosophy of Science, in The Tasks of Philosophy 3, 15-23 (Cambridge U. Press 2006). 
10. Key texts include Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2d ed., U. Notre Dame Press 
1984) [hereinafter MacIntyre, After Virtue); Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Ra· 
tionality? (U. Notre Dame Press 1988); Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry 226 (u. Notre Dame Press 1990) [hereinafter MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions); 
Alasdair MacIntyre, First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues 
(Marquette U. Press 1990). More recently, MacIntyre has begun to spell out the details of 
an alternative approach to moral philosophy rooted in the Aristotelian tradition. See, e.g., 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues 
(Carus Publg. Co. 1999) [hereinafter MacIntyre, Dependent]. MacIntyre does not refer to 
the post-Enlightenment worldview that he describes as a "paradigm" in Thomas Kuhn's 
sense of the term, but MacIntyre's account of the hold that that worldview has on our way 
of explaining and justifying human action supports the use of that term in Kuhn's sense. 
For MacIntyre's favorable view of Kuhn's general approach, see MacIntyre, Three Rival 
Versions, supra n. 10, at 17, 50, 118, 122. 
11. For MacIntyre's own summary of the key arguments in After Virtue, see Alasdair 
MacIntyre, The Claims of After Virtue, in The MacIntyre Reader 69, 69-72 (Kelvin Knight 
ed., Polity Press 1998). 
12. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in Virtue Ethics 26 (Roger Crisp & 
Michael Slote eds., Oxford U. Press 1997). 
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potentiality to act, how to realize our true nature and to reach our true
end. 13
According to this teleological account, each person passes through a
series of life stages and social roles, which might include child, son, fa-
ther, husband, and community member that are essential to who he or
she is. As MacIntyre writes,
These are not characteristics that belong to human beings accidentally,
to be stripped away in order to discover "the real me". They are part of
my substance, defining partially at least and sometimes wholly my obli-
gations and my duties. Individuals inherit a particular place within an
interlocking set of social relationships .... To know oneself as such a
social person is however not to occupy a static and fixed position. It is to
find oneself placed at a certain point on a journey with set goals; to
move through life is to make progress - or to fail to make progress -
toward a given end. 4
Progress toward any "given end" is part of the person's larger pro-
gress toward the human telos, toward realizing what is essential in
human nature, and such progress is guided by the precepts on virtue and
vice developed in the science of ethics. This teleological account of
human nature and action was the core of the old Aristotelian paradigm
that informed moral and ethical reflection, with some dissent, through
the Middle Ages and into the early modern era.
15
In the period leading up to the Enlightenment, the Aristotelian par-
adigm came under widespread intellectual attack. 16 According to
MacIntyre, "the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and
Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aris-
totelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-real-
13. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 52. MacIntyre notes that "[tihis scheme is
complicated and added to, but not essentially altered, when it is placed within a framework
of theistic beliefs, whether Christian, as with Aquinas, or Jewish with Maimonides, or Is-
lamic with Ibn Roschd. The precepts of ethics now have to be understood not only as teleo-
logical injunctions but also as expressions of divinely ordained law." Id. at 53. For another
more detailed account of how such teleological moral reasoning operates, see Alasdair
MacIntyre, Practical Rationalities as Forms of Social Structure, in The MacIntyre Reader
120, 121-124 (Kelvin Knight ed., Polity Press 1998) [hereinafter MacIntyre, Practical
Rationalities].
14. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 33-34.
15. Id. at 52-53.
16. For an account of Ren6 Descartes' reasons for rejecting teleological explanation in
the natural sciences, see Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being 124, 188 (Harvard U.
Press 1964). As Lovejoy states, Descartes was 'the most influential philosopher of the age"
immediately prior to the Enlightenment. Id. at 123. For a discussion of the metaphysician
Baruch Spinoza's reasons for rejecting teleological explanation, see id. at 156.
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ized-his-telos. '1 7 Eliminating the third element of the old framework -
the account of a human telos or end, the essential or "true" nature of man
- left behind two elements that bear an uncertain and potentially hostile
relationship to one another. "There is on the one hand a certain content
for morality: a set of injunctions deprived of their teleological context.
There is on the other hand a certain view of untutored-human-nature-as-
it-is."1s Enlightenment thinkers and their immediate successors, includ-
ing among numerous others Denis Diderot, David Hume, Immanuel
Kant, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, attempted
to develop new theoretical frameworks that would provide a rational link
between untutored human nature and the pre-existing, largely unques-
tioned catalogue of moral injunctions. 19 But because these thinkers "did
not recognize their own peculiar historical and cultural situation, they
could not recognize the impossible and quixotic character of their self-
appointed task."20 Why was their task impossible? Precisely because
they were trying to provide a rational explanation for the connection be-
tween "a set of moral injunctions on the one hand and a conception of
human nature on the other which had been expressly designed to be dis-
crepant with one another." 2 1 Explaining the nature of this discrepancy,
MacIntyre observes that
[s]ince the moral injunctions were originally at home in a scheme in
which their purpose was to correct, improve and educate . . . human
nature, they are clearly not going to be such as could be deduced from
true statements about human nature or justified in some other way by
appealing to its characteristics. The injunctions of morality, thus un-
derstood, are likely to be ones that human nature, thus understood, has
strong tendencies to disobey.22
According to MacIntyre, we live today with the continuing failure to
achieve a key objective of Enlightenment philosophers, i.e., "replac[ing]
what they took to be discredited traditional and superstitious forms of
morality by a kind of secular morality that would be entitled to secure
the assent of any rational person."2 3
[T]he great Enlightenment theorists had themselves disagreed both
morally and philosophically. Their heirs have, through brilliant and so-
17. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 54. For an alternative version of this claim,
see Alasdair MacIntyre, "Ought" in Against the Self-Images of the Age 136, 149-50 (U. Notre
Dame Press 1978).
18. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 55.
19. Id. at 39-50 (discussing Diderot, Hume, Kant, and Smith); Id. at 62-64 (discussing
Bentham and Mill). For a summary of the premises of Enlightenment thought, see Lovejoy,
The Great Chain of Being, supra n. 16, at 288-289.
20. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 55.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. MacIntyre, The Claims of After Virtue, supra n. 11, at 70.
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phisticated feats of argumentation, made it evident that if these dis-
agreements are not interminable, they are such at least that after two
hundred years no prospect of termination is in sight. Succeeding gener-
ations of Kantians, utilitarians, natural rights' theorists, and con-
tractarians show no sign of genuine convergence.
24
The post-Enlightenment paradigm under which we operate today
arose from and continues to reflect the inconclusiveness of this "inconclu-
sive intellectual debate,"25 this failure of philosophy to achieve rational
consensus on an account of morality and human nature.
The rejection of the old paradigm and the growing awareness of a
seemingly unbridgeable gulf between untutored-human-nature-as-it-is
and the received catalogue of moral injunctions ultimately led to a radi-
cal reinterpretation of the nature of the relationship between the "is" and
the "ought." Under the old Aristotelian paradigm, "[t]o call something
good . . . is ... to make a factual statement. To call a particular action
just or right is to say that it is what a good man would do in such a
situation; hence this type of statement too is factual. Within this tradi-
tion moral and evaluative statements can be called true or false in pre-
cisely the way in which all other factual statements can be so called."
2 6
On the [Aristotelian] view the facts about human action include the
facts about what is valuable to human beings (and not just the facts
about what they think to be valuable); on the [emerging modem] view
there are no facts about what is valuable. 'Fact' becomes value-free, 'is'
becomes a stranger to 'ought' and explanation, as well as evaluation,
changes its character as a result of this divorce between 'is' and
'ought'.2 7
Once one rejects the view that there is a telos or end that we all
share qua human beings, a telos or end about which we can make factual
claims potentially subject to rational public debate and resolution, it ap-
pears to follow that all accounts of "the" human end are actually ac-
counts of private ends and desires pursued by particular human beings
or groups. Maclntyre labels this characteristically modern philosophical
position "emotivism," i.e., "the doctrine that all evaluative judgments
and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or
evaluative in character. ' ' 28 Our ends thus come to be understood as per-
sonal "values," i.e., the grounds or bases of evaluative judgments, and
24. Alasdair MacIntyre, Some Enlightenment Projects Reconsidered, in Ethics and
Politics 172, 181-182 (Cambridge U. Press 2006).
25. MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, supra n. 10, at 227.
26. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 59.
27. Id. at 84. See also Alasdair MacIntyre, Some More about "Ought" in Against the
Self-Images of the Age 157, 169 (U. Notre Dame Press 1978).
28. Maclntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 11-12. According to MacIntyre, "to a large
degree people now think, talk and act as if emotivism were true, no matter what their
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they are relocated from the public and objective realm of factual disputa-
tion to the private and subjective realm of preference and feeling. Such
values, because they are private, cannot be scrutinized and appraised as
true or false according to the measure provided by the old notion of the
human telos or of a social order and rules based on that telos.29 "[T]he
self is now thought of as criterionless, because the kind of telos in terms
of which it once judged and acted is no longer thought to be credible."30
With its values placed beyond rational criticism or productive debate, the
self becomes a kind of sovereign in its own private realm of value. "[I]n
acquiring sovereignty in its own realm[, the modern self] lost its tradi-
tional boundaries provided by a social identity and a view of human life
as ordered to a given end."' 3 1 According to MacIntyre, this "self which
has no necessary social content and no necessary social identity can then
be anything, can assume any role or take any point of view, because it is
in and for itself nothing."32 As MacIntyre says in another context, this is
a self "whose distinctive identity consists in key part in the ability to
escape social identification, by always being able to abstract him or her-
self from any role whatsoever it is the individual who is potentially many
things, but actually in and for him or herself nothing."33
In MacIntyre's analysis, this fundamental shift in the understand-
ing of human nature or the human self caused, or at least reinforced,
distinctively modern, interlocking developments at the level of the single
person and the level of social institutions. At the level of the single per-
son, one sees the emergence or invention of the "individual" as a paradig-
matic unit of analysis.3 4 The notion3 5 is lost of a human self as an
essentially social being passing through a series of life stages and roles
and realizing the specifically human essence or telos. As MacIntyre
remarks,
[t]ake away the notion of essential nature, take away the corresponding
notion of what is good and best for members of a specific kind who share
avowed theoretical standpoint may be. Emotivism has become embodied in our culture."
Id. at 22.
29. This is not to suggest that one cannot make factual claims of a sort about values
within the post-Enlightenment paradigm. Indeed, it is quite common to make a factual
claim such as "X values liberty over equality" or "X values the woman's right to choose over
the fetus's right to life," and such a claim may be true or false. One cannot, however, verify
or falsify X's claim that "liberty is more valuable than equality," because that claim is un-
derstood to reflect X's private values.
30. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 33.
31. Id. at 34.
32. Id. at 32.
33. MacIntyre, Practical Rationalities, supra n. 13, at 135.
34. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 60. See MacIntyre, Practical Rationalities,
supra n. 13, at 129.
35. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 33-34.
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such a nature, and the Aristotelian scheme of the self which is to
achieve good ... necessarily collapses. There remains only the individ-
ual self with its pleasures and pains.
36
Because the individual has no essential nature and thus is not es-
sentially social, theoretical accounts of the individual tend to treat
society as nothing more than an arena in which individuals seek to se-
cure what is useful or agreeable to them. [Such accounts] thus tend to
exclude from view any conception of society as a community united in a
shared vision of the good for man (as prior to and independent of any
summing of individual interests) .... 37
Building on the work of Locke, Rousseau and Smith among others,
the post-Enlightenment paradigm relies heavily on concepts of contract
and market to explain and justify the individual's actions. 38 Individuals
pursue their interests, which come to be known as their utility, in a mar-
ket and they freely bind others through contracts. Individuals also come
to be seen as bearers of "rights," which are understood to protect each
individual from threats by other individuals or groups.3 9 According to
MacIntyre,
[tihe central conceptions informing thought within civil society about
human relationships are therefore those of utility, of contract and of
individual rights. And the moral philosophy which gives expression to
the standpoint of civil society consists of a continuing debate about
those concepts and how they are to be applied.
40
At the level of social institutions, the modern administrative state
and the modern bureaucratic corporation emerge as fundamental units
of analysis. Individuals who pursue their utility as defined by private
values invariably engender conflict that can trigger social disorder and
collapse. 4 1 Thus, in a world consisting of individuals, social order ap-
36. MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, supra n. 10, at 138.
37. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 236.
38. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (C.B. MacPherson, ed., Hackett
Publg. Co. 1988); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Richard W. Crosby
trans., King's Ct. Commun. 1978); Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976).
39. In a provocative discussion of Polynesian concepts of"taboo" and their treatment in
Western anthropological literature and political theory, MacIntyre concludes:
[t]he arrival upon the social scene of conceptions of right, attaching to and exer-
cised by individuals, as a fundamental moral quasilegal concept, whether in the
European later Middle Ages or seventeenth century, or in nineteenth-century Pol-
ynesia, always signals some measure of loss of or repudiation of some previous
social solidarity. Rights are claimed against some other person or persons; they
are invoked when and insofar as those others appear as threats.
MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, supra n. 10, at 184-185.
40. Alasdair MacIntyre, The Theses on Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken, in The
MacIntyre Reader 223, 223 (Kelvin Knight ed., Polity Press 1998).
41. The archetype of this argument is, of course, found in Hobbes's account of the
"warre ... of every man, against every man." Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 64 (Dent 1965).
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pears to be a fundamental problem, and social structures must be de-
vised to establish and maintain social order. What institutions will
guarantee order? Under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the charac-
teristic answer to that question is the bureaucracy. 4 2 Bureaucracies
"manipulat[e] ... human beings into compliant patterns of behavior"43 to
achieve political or economic ends or "interests." These ends or interests
do not find their justification in a shared vision of the human good or
telos because such a shared vision is not available. Thus, these bureau-
cratic ends or interests will appear to be arbitrary from the perspective
of any individual or group that does not happen to share the ends or
interests that the bureaucracy pursues. But the important point is that
some end or interest is pursued, and order is maintained. Modern bu-
reaucratic management is praised (or condemned) according to its per-
ceived "effectiveness" or "expertise"44 in ordering individual behavior in
light of such ends or interests.45
According to MacIntyre, the result of these interconnected personal
and institutional developments is a
bifurcation of the contemporary social world into a realm of the organi-
zational in which ends are taken to be given and are not available for
rational scrutiny and a realm of the personal in which judgment and
debate about values are central factors, but in which no rational social
resolution of issues is available .... 46
As a consequence of this bifurcation, political and moral debate
tends to organize itself into two immediately recognizable positions:
the contending parties agree . . .that there are only two alternative
modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary
choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is
sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of
individuals. 47
From this, MacIntyre concludes that "the society in which we live is
one in which bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well as an-
tagonists."48 He labels this state of affairs the "culture of bureaucratic
individualism." 49
42. For an explanation of how the term "bureaucracy" is being used here, see infra n.
192- 197 and accompanying text.
43. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 74.
44. Id. at 75, 86, 109 (acknowledging that his discussion of bureaucracy is heavily in-
debted to the work of Max Weber).
45. See id. at 88-108 (arguing that the type of effectiveness or expertise claimed by the
bureaucrat is not possible and refers to the belief in such expertise as the "fetishism ... of
bureaucratic skills.").
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 35.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 71.
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It should come as no surprise that MacIntyre's arguments have en-
countered criticism and debate on many different fronts. 50 It is not, how-
ever, the purpose of this Article to defend or criticize MacIntyre's
position. Rather, the objective is to show how the post-Enlightenment
paradigm and its difficulties illuminate certain important characteristics
of U.S. Internet privacy law. As this Article shows, the U.S. Internet
privacy regime reflects MacIntyre's description of the bifurcated post-En-
lightenment world. Paradoxically, calls for greater individual sover-
eignty typically result in an actual increase in bureaucratic control, at
least in part because the post-Enlightenment paradigm for explaining
and justifying human action leaves us with no apparent alternative. The
sovereign individual, it turns out, is lost without the bureaucracy, and
the bureaucracy takes as its raison d'etre the management of sovereign
individuals pursuing their personal objectives in the market according to
their private values.
As far as I know, MacIntyre has not participated in public discus-
sions of Internet privacy. But his account of the intellectual roots of
what this Article calls the post-Enlightenment paradigm allows us to
identify and explore the broader significance of at least three character-
istics that are likely to appear in any modern information-privacy re-
gime. First, one would expect such a regime to focus on individuals
because, as noted above,5 1 the rejection of a teleological account of
human nature left us with an understanding of society as a collection of
individuals each pursuing his or her own ends or utility according to his
or her own values. Who "I" am can no longer be answered in terms of
what it means to be a human being with this particular role in this com-
munity, but must be answered in terms of entirely contingent value-neu-
tral facts about me, including what I happen to desire or value. Indeed,
one would expect privacy itself to be understood as one more desire or
value that may receive legal protection and/or rhetorical support as a
"right" of each individual against other individuals and groups.
An information-privacy regime that focuses on the individual and
the value that he or she places on privacy can be expected to attach par-
ticular importance to the individual's consent. This follows from the par-
adigmatic account of the self as an individual with no essential
characteristics, no "true" nature or end. The "I" that is not anything in
particular, that has no essential identity, comes to be seen as little more
than the capacity to adopt successive identities, the capacity to affirm or
approve in successive acts of will this characteristic as at least tempora-
50. See id. at 264-79 (discussing some of the initial objections to MacIntyre's argu-
ments and his first responses); see also Kelvin Knight, Guide to Further Reading, in Alas-
dair MacIntyre, The MacIntyre Reader 276 (Kelvin Knight ed., Polity Press 1998).
51. See supra n. 34 (and accompanying text).
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rily "mine" and to disaffirm or dismiss that characteristic as "other" or
"not really me."5 2 Thus, the descriptors "gay man" and "law professor"
may not relate to my "true" nature, because I have no "true" nature, but
my capacity to consent to one or both (or neither) of these descriptors as
mine, my capacity to choose, is somehow essential to who I am. As
MacIntyre contends, one of the
dominant images [of our culture] is that of the individual human being
as one who defines her or himself through her or his acts of choice,
choices which determine for her or him not only what use to make of
this or that object and what attitude to take to this or that other human
being, but also how to describe or to redescribe, to classify or reclassify
the objects and the uses, the other human beings and the attitudes.5 3
By protecting and enhancing this capacity to consent or choose, a
privacy regime seems to protect the core of one's identity, i.e., one's sov-
ereign capacity to construct identities for oneself. Moreover, by focusing
on the individual's consent, a privacy regime can avoid appraising the
values that lay behind the individual's consent, since there is no shared
criterion for assessing the truth or falsity of those values. "All prefer-
ences of all individuals are to be weighed in the same balance and ac-
corded the same respect, no matter whose they are or what their
grounding."54 Consent thus becomes the gown that covers a multitude of
sins.
Second, under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, because the con-
senting individual has no essential nature and the realm of fact is under-
stood to be value-free, one would expect an information-privacy regime to
reflect a certain ambivalence about the significance of PII. On the one
hand, because the individual is essentially no one or nothing, the individ-
ual may come to see his or her identity as an individual - who or what he
or she is - as itself a fundamental issue. At the level of professional phil-
osophical discourse, this issue manifests itself as (among other things)
the so-called "problem of personal identity"55 and drives the reflections of
the existentialists. 56 At the level of personal experience, one would ex-
pect to see anxiety about the significance of PII. Facts about the individ-
ual and what the individual has done seem to provide a kind of content to
the "I" who lacks an essential nature. I "am" a person with this name
and address, this height and weight, this gender and sexual orientation,
52. Maclntyre, After Virture, supra n. 10, at 39-45, 32, 115-117.
53. Alasdair MacIntyre, Philosophy Recalled to Its Tasks: A Thomistic Reading of
Fides et Ratio, in The Tasks of Philosophy 179, 195-196 (Cambridge University Press 2006).
54. MacIntyre, Practical Rationalities, supra n. 13, at 129.
55. MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, supra n. 10, at 199.
56. See William Barrett, Irrational Man (Doubleday 1958) (providing a good overview
of the work of the major figures in existential philosophy (i.e., Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
Heidegger and Sartre)).
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this social security number. Loss of such PII or of consensual authority
over it seems to entail loss of oneself, and such loss could trigger tremen-
dous anxiety in a self that, without such PII over which to exercise au-
thority, stands in constant danger of vanishing. Thus, under the post-
Enlightenment paradigm, an information-privacy regime might be ex-
pected to address the individual's anxiety about loss of consensual au-
thority over PII.
On the other hand, because the individual is understood to lack es-
sential characteristics and because the facts about the individual have
no intrinsic value, the same individual who is very anxious about retain-
ing authority over his or her PII must acknowledge that items of such
PII can be discarded or disseminated without real loss to the self. I may
stand six feet three inches tall and weigh 210 pounds, but this height
and weight are not who I "really am," not the "true" me, because there is
no "real" or "true" me. My height and weight are simply value-free facts.
Facts can, however, acquire value of a sort when and if the individual
consents to trade them in a market, because others may value them as a
means to their own ends. Clothing sellers, for example, might be inter-
ested in acquiring PII about my height and weight in order to tout cer-
tain kinds of apparel to me. I can also exercise my consensual authority
over this value-free PII by trading it for something I value more. Thus,
under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, one would expect an informa-
tion-privacy regime built around the consenting individual who has no
essential nature to acknowledge the need for an institution such as a
market in which the individual can trade PII to obtain or achieve what
he or she values and thereby increase or maximize his or her utility.
Third, under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, one would expect
an information-privacy regime to emphasize bureaucratic supervision.
Again, this expectation derives from the importance of individuals and
individual consent in a world lacking a credible shared vision of the
human telos. As already noted,5 7 in a world consisting of individuals
who pursue their values and exercise their wills or capacities to consent
in a market, a rational resolution to conflict is not available and disorder
seems to be an ever-present threat. Accordingly, one would expect to
find institutions devoted to limiting conflict and coordinating or channel-
ing the consent of individuals. Two such institutions have become para-
digmatic. On one side are large-scale private bureaucratic enterprises -
e.g., modern corporations - that respond to and channel individual con-
sensual activity in the market by organizing and standardizing demand
for and use of individuals' PII. On the other side is a public bureaucratic
administrative apparatus with authority to oversee and, where neces-
sary, limit the exercise of individual will and the related activities of cor-
57. See supra n. 46 (and accompanying text).
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porate enterprises. MacIntyre observes that "the major justification
advanced for the intervention of government in society is the contention
that government has resources of competence which most citizens do not
possess."5 8 Accordingly, public officials will justify administering the
privacy of consenting individuals by appealing to superior competence or
expertise, and they will claim to act as an impersonal public check on the
strife-torn marketplace of individual will. Thus, by a curious paradox,
under the post-Enlightenment paradigm, the impersonal administrative
state may come to be seen as a necessary precondition of the modern
individual's capacity to construct his or her personal identity through
acts of consent to, and affirmation of, particular items of personal infor-
mation as "mine" or "not mine".
It may be useful to deal here with two possible objections before pro-
ceeding with the argument. The first objection asks why we need to rely
on Alasdair MacIntyre, or indeed any philosopher, for the proposition
that a modern information-privacy regime is likely to focus on individu-
als, markets, and bureaucratic oversight. In response, it may be useful
to cite a comment by Alfred North Whitehead, who wrote (perhaps with
some irony) that "[fR amiliar things happen, and mankind does not bother
about them. It takes a very unusual mind to undertake the analysis of
the obvious." 59 In the spirit of Whitehead, it is a working hypothesis of
this Article that such "obvious" aspects of a modern information-privacy
regime as individuals, markets, and bureaucracies are obvious because
they reflect the post-Enlightenment paradigm that has come to structure
our ordinary understanding of the world. Hence, this Article examines
not just the obvious but the obviousness of the obvious in order to un-
cover some of the premises and limits of our notion of privacy protection.
The second objection goes to the repeated references in this Article
to "the" post-Enlightenment paradigm. Surely it is not credible to argue
that there is a single paradigm that supervened upon the collapse of the
old Aristotelian paradigm. If anything, our era is characterized by the
lack of an authoritative or powerful paradigm for explaining human na-
ture and justifying human action. Consequently, thoughtful people have
to muddle through discussions of these issues and make decisions rely-
ing on their best intuitions and insights. There are at least two answers
to this objection. First, MacIntyre6 ° and this author are both prepared to
acknowledge that there are competing paradigms in the post-Enlighten-
ment era. The argument here is based on the somewhat more modest
claim that a great many of us have learned to organize our thoughts
58. MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 85.
59. Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World 4 (Macmillan 1953).
60. MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, supra n. 10, at 170-215 (comparing and contrast-
ing the Encylopaedist, Thomist and Genealogist frameworks).
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about our lives and our world in accordance with "the" post-Enlighten-
ment paradigm outlined in this section. 6 1 Second, the objection itself
provides evidence of the power of the post-Enlightenment paradigm by
appearing to adopt one of its key tenets, i.e., that moral disagreement
and the multiplicity of personal perspectives are an inevitable feature of
our intellectual environment that must be confronted by an act of indi-
vidual choice or decision. Thus, in many respects, the "to each his own
paradigm" argument is itself simply a version of one essential element of
the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
III. CONSENT UNDER U.S. INTERNET PRIVACY LAWS
Influenced by political calculation rather than the arguments of phi-
losophers, such as MacIntyre, Congress has shown no inclination to reg-
ulate online information-privacy comprehensively. 6 2 Instead, Congress
has relied to a large extent on a pre-existing administrative bureaucracy
- the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") - to protect privacy in the on-
line environment under the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC
Act"). 6 3 As discussed in Section A below, the FTC has concluded that the
best way to protect privacy online is to ensure that any information an
individual receives from a Web site about how PII will be used is accu-
rate and not misleading. Congress concluded that in one area - i.e., chil-
dren's privacy - a new law was required to respond to the emergence of
the Internet. As discussed in Section B below, in the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA"), Congress required Web site operators
to obtain the informed consent of a child's parents before collecting the
child's PII via the Internet. In effect, COPPA reinforced the FTC's posi-
tion that the key to privacy protection online is the adult individual's
informed consent bolstered by FTC oversight.
A. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The FTC seeks to protect the privacy of individuals who use the In-
ternet under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or decep-
tive practices in and affecting commerce. 6 4 The FTC, following the
61. Cf. MacIntyre's comment, supra n. 28 (contending that "[elmotivism has become
embodied in our culture.").
62. Ronald J. Mann & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce 211 (2d ed., Aspen Publish-
ers 2005).
63. See John C. Dugan et al., Privacy and E-Commerce in the United States, in E-
Commerce Law & Business 9-96 - 9-175 (Mark E. Plotkin et al. eds., Aspen Publishers
2003) (examining other sector specific privacy laws the United States has adopted that also
have an impact on the Internet).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
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agency's long-standing approach to false and misleading advertising,6 5
has taken the position that a Web site operator violates Section 5 if the
operator acts in a manner that is not consistent with material represen-
tations made in the Web site's privacy policy. 66 In other words, if a Web
site states that an individual's PII will be collected only for certain speci-
fied purposes and may be transferred only to specified third parties, the
Web site operator must ensure that any PII collected is used only for
those purposes and transferred only to those third parties. Use of the PII
for an unspecified purpose or transfer to an unspecified third party will
render the Web site's statements about privacy protection deceptive and
could subject the Web site operator to an injunction or civil penalty
under Section 5.67
There is, of course, an obvious objection to the FTC's approach to
online information privacy. The FTC can act only if a Web site operator
fails to abide by the Web site's privacy policy or other privacy commit-
ments made on the Web site. But if the Web site contains no privacy
policy and makes no material representations concerning protection of
PII, the Web site's operator probably will escape the FTC's reach.68 In
fact, this objection highlights the central role of individual consensual
authority and responsibility in the FTC's scheme. If, consistent with his
or her own values, an individual decides to provide PII to a Web site that
makes no representations about whether and how it will protect the PII,
then the individual must live with the consequences of his or her deci-
sion. The rule is caveat emptor. In a community with no shared vision of
the good, an individual remains free to make decisions that others might
regard as inexplicable or mistaken, because there is no agreed criterion
against which we can appraise the individual's values. Web site opera-
tors remain free to decide, in light of their own perceived but equally
"criterionless" 6 9 interests, whether and to what extent they wish to make
65. See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-
decept.htm (Oct. 14, 1983) (reprinted in 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 689-90, 694
(1983)).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 52(b) (2000); see also Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair
Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, A Report to Congress 34, http://www.
ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (May 2000) [hereinafter FTC 2000 Report].
67. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
68. Id. (providing that the FTC also has the authority, under Section 5, to take action
against a Web site operator whose conduct is deemed to be "unfair."). See U.S. v. Choice-
Point Inc. 26, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint0523069complaint.pdf (Jan. 30,
2006) (asserting that a data processor's security procedures were not merely "deceptive"
under Section 5 because they contradicted the processor's material representations but also
and independently that those procedures were "unfair" under Section 5). It remains to be
seen whether the FTC will use its unfairness authority more broadly in this area to impose
a standard independent of that set by a data processor's own material representations.
69. See supra n. 30 (and accompanying text).
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privacy protection commitments that the FTC will enforce.
Although this laissez faire approach might appeal to some theorists
who value the anarchic qualities of the Internet,70 the FTC has not pub-
licly espoused caveat emptor, presumably because caveat emptor tends
to be politically unpopular with the emptor and his or her elected repre-
sentatives. From the mid-1990s onward, polling data suggested that
many people in the United States were not happy with the level of pri-
vacy protection on the Internet. 7 1 For example, a study reported by Bus-
iness Week in 2000 showed that about one quarter of Internet users
believed that their privacy had been invaded and some 40 percent of peo-
ple who shopped online had concerns about the privacy and security of
their PII. 72 According to the same study, many people who had avoided
buying products and services over the Internet cited lack of privacy pro-
tection as an important reason. 73 Faced with such data and recognizing
that a Republican-controlled Congress might refuse to enact comprehen-
sive privacy legislation, the FTC decided instead to press for industry
self-regulation.7 4
70. See, Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1095 (1996) (arguing
that Constitutional principles of federalism limit state authority to regulate the Internet);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace is separate from real space and should
be subject to its own rules instead of national regulatory regimes); Lawrence Lessig, The
Zones of Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1403 (1996) (criticizing the Johnson & Post argu-
ment); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998) (criticizing
the Johnson & Post argument); David G. Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and
Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1439 (2000) (responding to Lessig); see also, Lea
Brilmayer & Jack Goldsmith, Conflict of Laws Cases and Materials 840-857 (5th ed., Aspen
Law & Business 2002) (showing that the debate about whether and how to impose domestic
laws on the Internet is now sufficiently mainstream that it has found its way into standard
casebooks).
71. See Public Opinion on Privacy, http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey (last updated
May 15, 2006) (summarizing the results of numerous polls reflecting consumer concerns
about privacy).
72. Business Week Online, Business WeekIHarris Poll: A Growing Threat, http://www.
businessweek.com/2000/00-12/b3673010.htm (March 20, 2000); See Susannah Fox, The
Pew Internet & American Life Project, Trust and Privacy Online: Why Americans Want to
Rewrite the Rules, http://www.pewinternet.orglpdfs/PIPTrustPrivacyReport.pdf (Aug.
20, 2000).
73. Id.
74. Federal Trade Commission, Online Profiling: A Report to Congress, Part 2 Recom-
mendations 10, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/onlineprofiling.pdf (July 2000) [hereinafter
FTC Online Profiling Recommendations Report] (stating that, in 2000, the FTC called on
Congress to adopt legislation to regulate online privacy practices); Timothy J. Muris, Pro-
tecting Consumers' Privacy: 2002 and Beyond, Remarks at the Privacy 2001 Conference,
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privispl002.htm (Oct. 4, 2001) (suggesting that under
the Bush Administration, the FTC has stopped calling for new legislation and renewed its
focus on self-regulation).
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Between 1996 and 2002, the FTC held several public hearings 7 5 and
produced a number of public reports76 on a variety of online privacy and
security issues. In 1998, the FTC urged industry to adopt five basic
"Fair Information Practice Principles"7 7 - notice, choice, access, security,
and enforcement. 78 A Web site operator who chooses to comply with
these principles is encouraged to post a privacy policy that tells a user in
some detail what the operator will do with any PHI collected via the Web
site.79 In particular, the operator should give the user an opportunity to
opt out of data collection or should seek some affirmative evidence that
he or she wishes to opt in.8 0 The FTC's emphasis on posting privacy
policies and obtaining user consent shows that the FTC regarded in-
formed consent as the appropriate basis for collection and use of PII. If a
Web site operator posts a privacy policy, the FTC will have authority
under Section 5 to enforce the policy and ensure that it does not deceive
or mislead individuals who provide PII to the Web site. The Web site
operator ultimately determines what commitments, if any, he or she will
make with respect to collection and use of PII, and the FTC can hold the
Web site operator to those commitments.8 1
Much of the FTC's work on the issue of informed consent has focused
on so-called "secondary" or "unrelated" uses of PII. According to the
75. See Federal Trade Commission, Reports, Letters and Workshops, http://www.ftc.
gov/privacy/reports.htm (accessed July 1, 2006) (listing the FTC's workshops on privacy).
76. See e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, http:ll
www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (June 1998) [hereinafter FTC 1998 Report]; Fed-
eral Trade Commission, Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Report to Congress 12,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf (July 1999); Federal Trade Commission, Final
Report of the FTC Advisory Committee on Online Access and Security, http://www.ftc.gov/
acoas/papers/finalreport.htm (May 15, 2000) (reporting on various options for establishing
standards for accessing PH1 collected online); Federal Trade Commission, Online Profiling:
A Report to Congress, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf
(June 2000); FTC Online Profiling Recommendations Report, supra n. 74; FTC 2000 Report,
supra n. 66.
77. See FTC 1998 Report, supra n. 76, at 7-11.
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 7-8.
80. Id. at 8-9.
81. The FTC's authority to hold a website operator to his or her commitments should
not be underestimated. Once a website operator has made representations concerning col-
lection and use of PHI, the FTC enjoys considerable leeway to determine what those repre-
sentations mean to the individual website user and to determine what steps the website
operator must take to comply with those commitments. For example, in the FTC's case
against Microsoft concerning the Passport online authentication system, the FTC used a
statement in Microsoft's privacy policy that it would hold PII in a secure manner as a basis
for a Consent Order imposing a variety of specific data security requirements on Microsoft.
Federal Trade Commission, Decision and Order, File No. 012 3240, http:/www.ftc.gov/os/
2002/12/microsoftdecision.pdf (2002). For a brief discussion of FTC's enforcement activities
in the area of online privacy, see infra n. 83-90 (and accompanying text).
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FTC, a Web site operator must give an individual a choice when the op-
erator wishes to use the individual's PII for a purpose not specified in the
Web site's privacy policy when the information was collected.8 2 If the
Web site operator does not give the individual such a choice and proceeds
to use the individual's PII for a previously unspecified purpose, this sec-
ondary or unrelated use will render the privacy policy deceptive under
Section 5. If the Web site operator gives the individual an informed
choice and the individual in some manner signals his or her consent,
then the newly specified purpose(s) become part of the Web site's privacy
policy, at least with respect to that individual. Section 5 will then re-
quire the Web site operator to act in a manner that is consistent with the
amended privacy policy.
The FTC's focus on informed consent for secondary or unrelated uses
of PII reveals an important fact about the scope of Section 5. Consent is
legally relevant only in a limited sense with respect to "primary" uses of
an individual's PII, i.e., uses that were specified in a Web site's privacy
policy at the time the individual's PII was collected. Under the FTC Act,
the key question is whether the Web site operator has used and is using
the individual's PII in a manner that is consistent with the Web site's
privacy policy. If the answer is "yes," then the FTC has no authority to
inquire into whether the Web site also obtained the individual's consent.
One could argue that the FTC infers the individual's consent from the
fact that the individual provided PII to the Web site. But this argument
goes beyond the language of Section 5, which does not grant any legal
significance to an individual's consent per se. The individual's consent is
legally relevant only in the sense that the individual's decision to provide
PIH to a Web site binds the Web site operator under Section 5 to adhere
to any material representations concerning use of PII that the operator
may have made at the time the individual provided the PII. If an indi-
vidual wanted the FTC to initiate enforcement action on the ground that
he or she did not consent to collection and use of PII, however, the indi-
vidual would have to show that the Web site's privacy policy materially
misrepresented the uses that the Web site operator would make of the
individual's PII. In other words, the individual would have to show ab-
sence of proper notice in order to raise the issue of non-consent under
Section 5.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss in detail the FTC's
enforcement actions in the area of online privacy.8 3 It is sufficient to
note that the FTC has brought several high-profile cases and reached
82. FTC 1998 Report, supra n. 76, at 8-9.
83. See Dugan, supra n. 63, at 9-56 - 9-63(discussing the FTC's enforcement activities);
see also Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Initiatives: Unfairness and Deception, http:H/
www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises-enf.html (providing links to documents re-
lated to the cases that the FTC has brought).
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settlements with, among others, Microsoft,8 4  Eli Lilly,8 5 Toys-
mart.com,8 6 GeoCities,87 ReverseAuction.com, 8 8 and various online
pharmacies8 9 . In each of these cases, the FTC alleged among other
things that the Web site operator failed to abide by the representations
made in an online privacy policy, either with respect to the collection and
use of PII or with respect to the level of security that would be provided
for such PIH after collection, or both. The FTC has been particularly in-
sistent that Web site operators abide by any commitments that they may
have made regarding disclosure of PII to third parties - presumably be-
cause such disclosure may significantly increase the risk that an individ-
ual's PII will be used for purposes other than those represented in the
privacy policy of the Web site that collected the PII. In the GeoCities
case, for example, the FTC accused GeoCities of disclosing PII collected
from its members to third parties despite an explicit pledge not to do so.
In the ensuing consent order, GeoCities agreed to post a privacy policy
that clearly and accurately described its policy on disclosing PIH to third
parties.90
THE CHILDREN'S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
Although Congress has allowed the FTC to oversee most aspects of
online privacy under long-standing provisions of the FTC Act, publicity
surrounding collection of PII from children via the Internet prompted
Congress to adopt COPPA, which supplements the FTC's legal authority
in the area of children's information privacy.9 1 As one leading commen-
tary states, COPPA "governs the collection, use, and disclosure of chil-
dren's personal information by any operator of a Web site or online
service directed to children, or any operator that has actual knowledge
that it is collecting or maintaining personal information collected from a
84. See FTC Press Release, Microsoft Settles Charges Alleging False Security and Pri-
vacy Promises, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/08/microsoft.htm (Aug. 8, 2002).
85. See FTC Press Release, Eli Lilly Settles FTC Charges Concerning Security Breach,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/elililly.htm (Jan. 18, 2002).
86. See FTC Press Release, FTC Sues Failed Website, Toysmart.com, for Deceptively
Offering for Sale Personal Information of Website Visitors, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/
toysmart.htm (July 10, 2000).
87. See FTC Press Release, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively
Collecting Personal Information in Agency's First Internet Privacy Case, http://www.ftc.gov!
opaI1998/08/geocitie.htm (Aug. 13, 1998).
88. See FTC Press Release, Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges, http:!!
www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/01/reverse4.htm (Jan. 6, 2000).
89. FTC Press Release, Online Pharmacies Settle FTC Charges, http:/www.ftc.gov/
opa/2000/07/iog.htm (July 12, 2000).
90. Federal Trade Commission, Agreement Containing Consent Order, File No.
9823051, http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/08/geo-ord.htm (1998).
91. See Mann & Winn, supra n. 62, at 201.
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child."9 2 In essence, COPPA requires a covered Web site operator to pro-
vide notice to and obtain opt-in consent from a child's parents before col-
lecting the child's PII. As will be shown below, 93 by making a parent
legally responsible for his or her child's PI1 and thereby recognizing the
legal significance of an adult's informed consent, COPPA affirms the
FTC's general approach under Section 5. Just as a parent is legally re-
sponsible for his or her child's PII under COPPA, an adult individual is
legally responsible for his or her own PII under the FTC Act.
For purposes of this Article,94 it is instructive to note the key ways
in which the approach to children's privacy under COPPA differs from
the FTC approach to protecting adult's online privacy.9 5 First, of course,
COPPA creates a new category of legal subjects whose PII will receive
special treatment under Section 5. This new category is denominated
"children." Instead of drawing the line between "adult" and "child" at a
traditional location such as 18 or 21 years of age, Congress defined chil-
dren as only those individuals who are under the age of 13.96 Thus, an
individual 13 years of age or older retains legal responsibility under Sec-
tion 5 for decisions about whether to allow a Web site operator to collect
and use his or her PII.
Second, COPPA incorporates a scienter or intent element unknown
under Section 5. Under Section 5, the Web site operator's intent or
knowledge is not legally relevant. The only question is what, if any, ma-
terial representations the operator made concerning the treatment that
PII would receive at the time a particular person provided PII to the Web
site.
By contrast, the requirements of COPPA apply if and only if a Web site
directs content to children under 13 or the operator has actual knowl-
edge that the Web site is collecting or holding PII provided by a child
under 13. 9 7 The Web site operator's intent will be ascertained objec-
92. Dugan et al., supra n. 63, at 9-84 - 9-96.
93. See infra n. 114 (and accompanying text).
94. See Dugan et al., supra n. 63, at 9-84 - 9-96 (providing a more detailed review of
COPPA and the compliance issues that it raises for Web site operators).
95. Violations of the FTC's regulations implementing COPPA (the "COPPA Rule") are
deemed unfair and deceptive acts in violation of Section 5. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(c) (2000) (stat-
ing that a violation of COPPA's regulations "shall be treated as a violation of a rule defin-
ing an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under" 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B)) (2000);
16 C.F.R. § 312.9 (1999). Thus, strictly speaking, it is not accurate to contrast COPPA and
the COPPA Rule with Section 5. COPPA and the COPPA Rule define the parameters of
Section 5 in the area of children's online privacy. In order to avoid constant use of cumber-
some clarifying language, however, this Article treats Section 5 and COPPA as though they
were separate legal regimes, the former covering adult online privacy and the latter cover-
ing children's online privacy.
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(1) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (1999).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (1999).
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tively. In the preamble to the regulation implementing COPPA
("COPPA Rule"), the FTC states that the content of the Web site as a
whole will determine whether the Web site is directed toward children.98
The FTC considers "among other things, the site's 'subject matter, visual
or audio content, age of models, language or other characteristics of the
Web site or online service . . . . "99 In effect, whether a Web site is "di-
rected" to children turns on whether a reasonable user would conclude,
based on an examination of the Web site as a whole, that the Web site
operator intends to reach children and gather their PII.
Third, COPPA and the COPPA Rule differ from Section 5 in mandat-
ing that Web site operators post a privacy notice. Under Section 5, a
Web site operator does not have to post a privacy policy or provide any
form of notice before collecting PIH from Internet users. By contrast, a
Web site subject to COPPA must post a notice outlining the Web site's
information practices, including a description of the types of information
collected from children, how the information is collected (actively or pas-
sively), how the information will be used, and whether the information
will be disclosed to third parties.100 COPPA also requires the Web site
operator to provide a similar notice directly to a child's parent10 1 before
collecting the child's PHI or upon becoming aware that the Web site pos-
sesses PHI pertaining to a child. 10 2 Section 5, by contrast, does not re-
quire that a special notice be directed to anyone.
The fourth and arguably most important difference between Section
5 and COPPA is that the latter, with limited exceptions,' 0 3 requires a
Web site operator to obtain "verifiable" parental consent, 10 4 i.e., the con-
sent of someone who is verifiably the child's parent, before collecting PIH
98. Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,893 (Nov. 3,
1999).
99. Id. (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 22753, 22764 (Apr. 27, 1999)).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(b)(2)(i)-(iii) (1999).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(7) (2000); 16 C.F.R. . § 312.2 (1999) (providing that the term "par-
ent" includes a child's legal guardian).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (2000); 16 C.F.R. . § 312.4(c) (1999).
103. The FTC has established five exceptions to the requirement that parental consent
be obtained before collection of a child's PII. Without prior parental consent, an operator
may collect: (1) a child's or parent's name or e-mail address solely in order to provide notice
and seek consent; (2) a child's e-mail address for the "sole purpose of responding directly on
a one-time basis to a specific request from the child," provided the e-mail address will not
be used again for any other purpose; (3) a child's e-mail address to respond more than once
to a specific request from the child (e.g., for a subscription to a newsletter) but for no other
purpose; (4) a child's name or e-mail address if it is "reasonably necessary" to protect the
safety of a child who uses the site or online service; and (5) a child's name or e-mail address
to protect a Web site's security, "take precautions against liability," respond to a court or-
der, or provide information to law enforcement. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2) (2000); 16 C.F.R.
§ 312.5(c) (1999).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (1999).
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from a child or immediately after determining that an individual from
whom the operator previously collected PII is a child. Such consent in-
cludes "any reasonable effort (taking into consideration available tech-
nology)" to ensure parental authorization.10 5 Under Section 5, no
affirmative requirement to obtain consent exists.
COPPA and the COPPA Rule differ from Section 5 in a fifth and
final way. The former impose access and security requirements on Web
site operators that strengthen parental authority over a child's PII on
the Internet. Under COPPA and the COPPA Rule, parents have a right
to review and delete PII that a Web site may hold regarding their chil-
dren. 10 6 The Web site operat6r must take steps to ensure that the per-
son seeking access to a child's PII is the parent.10 7 Parental consent and
parental control are absolute. The parent, once properly identified, may
forbid the Web site operator to collect any further PII from the child, and
the Web site operator must comply.' 0 8 In addition to establishing the
parent's right of access, the COPPA Rule also requires a Web site opera-
tor to implement appropriate security technologies and mechanisms.' 0 9
This security requirement appears to flow from Congress' decision to
make informed parental consent the core of privacy protection for chil-
dren online. In effect, the COPPA Rule requires a Web site operator to
implement security measures sufficient to ensure that a child's PIH will
not be accessed or used in a manner that is inconsistent with the privacy
commitments that the operator made in obtaining the parent's consent.
Under COPPA, the FTC has brought a number of actions against
Web site operators. Typically, in these actions, a key allegation is that
the Web site operator failed to obtain parental consent. For example, in
April 2002, the FTC announced that the Ohio Art Company, operator of
the Etch-A-Sketch Web site, collected PHI without obtaining parental
consent.1 10 Instead, according to the FTC, the Web site told children to
obtain a parent's permission before submitting PII. Furthermore, the
FTC alleged that the Web site had collected more PIH than necessary for
its specified purposes and failed to post a COPPA-compliant privacy pol-
icy."1 The FTC also has leveled accusations of failure to obtain parental
consent against, among others, Monarch Services, Inc. and Girls Life,
Inc., operators of www.girlslife.com; Bigmailbox.com and Nolan Quan,
operators of www.bigmailbox.com; and Looksmart Ltd., operator of
105. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(9) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (1999).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B) (2000); 16 C.F.R. §312.6(a) (1999).
107. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(3) (1999); 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,904-05.
108. 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,904.
109. Id. at 59,906.
110. FTC, FTC Protecting Children's Privacy Online, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/
coppaanniv.htm (Apr. 22, 2002).
111. Id.
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www.insidetheweb.com. 112 The FTC made a similar charge against
American Pop Corn Company's "Jolly Time" Web site. 1 13 In these cases,
the FTC has collected civil penalties ranging from $10,000 to $35,000.
It was suggested above that by enacting COPPA, Congress implicitly
endorsed and reinforced the FTC's approach to adult online privacy
under Section 5 of the FTC Act. 114 Congress gave parents the legal au-
thority over, and responsibility for, their children's PII and required Web
site operators to respect that authority and responsibility. In taking this
step, Congress must have presumed that an adult parent has the capa-
bility to determine (1) whether a Web site should collect PII from the
child and (2) how, if at all, the Web site may be permitted to use the PII.
This is, in a nutshell, the position that the FTC has taken with respect to
protection of adult privacy under Section 5. The FTC presumes that an
adult individual has the capability to determine whether a Web site's
posted privacy policy, if any, is consistent with the individual's values
concerning how his or her PII should be used. Through Section 5, the
FTC recognizes the adult individual's legal authority over, and responsi-
bility for, his or her PII, and imposes on Web site operators a require-
ment to respect the adult individual's decisions by adhering to any
privacy statements that the Web site operator made before collecting the
PII. If Congress had not trusted adults to make informed decisions
about the use of their own P11, it is extremely difficult to believe that
Congress would have reposed such trust in those same adults acting as
parents with respect to children's PII.
IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRIVACY
A. WHY Discuss ADMINISTRATION?
Section III outlined the rules that make up the U.S. Internet privacy
regime; but rules alone, abstracted from their social and historical con-
text, cannot convey the full significance of administration in the protec-
tion of online privacy. In order to understand the significance of
administration, it is useful to view the Internet privacy regime in the
broader context of U.S. administrative law and history, which incorpo-
rate several important presumptions about the relationships among in-
dividuals, markets, and agencies. These presumptions inform the FTC's
approach to Internet privacy, and they reflect an analytical framework
112. Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Settlements with Web Sites that Collected
Children's Personal Data Without Parental Permission, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/04/
girlslife.htm (Apr. 19, 2001).
113. Press Release, FTC, Popcorn Company Settles FTC Privacy Violation Charges;
"Jolly Time" Web Site Collected Information from Kids Without Parents' Consent, http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/popcorn.htm (Feb. 14, 2002).
114. See supra n. 93 (and accompanying text).
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very similar to the post-Enlightenment paradigm. 115
B. FOUR REGULATORY MODELS
In a lengthy article examining the development of post-Civil War
federal regulation in the United States, Professor Rabin distinguishes
four regulatory "models" employed by the U.S. government at different
times and in different sorts of circumstances. 116 On a continuum run-
ning from a "weaker model of government intervention" to a stronger
model, these are (1) "common law tort and property," (2) "policing," (3)
"market-corrective" or "associational" 117 and (4) "public control."1 18 The
policing model was first used in the late 19th century in the Interstate
Commerce Act ("IC Act"), n 9 which established the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC"), and again in the early 20th century in the Trade
Commission Act, 120 which established the FTC. 12 1 According to Rabin,
the policing model "was premised on an autonomous market-controlled
economy. But adherents to this view were willing to concede that the
market systematically generated certain 'excessively competitive' prac-
tices such as the manufacture of products that seriously endangered
health and safety or the setting of rates that were particularly discrimi-
natory."122 In the face of such practices, traditional common law tort
remedies were considered insufficient, so Congress created federal agen-
cies with powers to police particular markets and prevent excessive
competition.
Rabin contrasts the policing model with the market-corrective or as-
sociational model of regulation 12 3 embodied in New Deal programs such
115. See supra Section II.
116. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev.
1189 (1985-86).
117. Id. at 1192.
118. Id. at 1193.
119. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). For a short history
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Ari Hoogenboom & Olive Hoogenboom, A His-
tory of the ICC: From Panacea to Palliative (Norton 1976).
120. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914). For a standard short
history of the creation of the FTC, see Gerald C. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion 1-48 (Yale U. Press 1924). For a brief account of the development of FTC authority
over false and deceptive advertising - the authority FTC has cited as the legal basis for
enforcing Web site privacy policies - see Ira M. Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission
and False Advertising, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 439, 450-54 (1964).
121. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1191, 1225.
122. Id. at 1192.
123. Id. at 1243. For a different perspective on New Deal regulatory models and pro-
grams that is largely consistent with Rabin's account, see Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal
Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 299 (1983).
For a standard, relatively brief history of the New Deal, see Paul K. Conkin, The New Deal
(3d ed., Harlan Division 1992).
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as the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), 124 the Agricultural
Adjustment Act ("AAA"),12 5 and the National Labor Relations Act 12 6
("NLRA"). As Rabin suggests, NIRA and the AAA reflected a "substan-
tial shift in traditional conceptions of the separate spheres of public and
private activity."12 7 Similarly, "the NLRA served as a buffer against ine-
quality of bargaining power in the labor market."128 In general, propo-
nents of market-corrective regulation doubted the ability of autonomous
private markets to correct themselves, and these doubts resulted in a
"commitment to permanent market stabilization activity by the federal
government."1 2 9 To promote stabilization, market-corrective legislation
typically incorporated "price-fixing, information-sharing and market-al-
locating schemes . . . .",130 The overarching objective was to "control the
output of goods, rather than stimulate demand directly by pumping
money into the economy."1 3 1 Government took on substantial responsi-
bility for economic planning because, as Professor Gifford has remarked,
"planning and supervision of growth are logical outcomes of price and
entry regulation."1 32
Rabin's fourth regulatory model, about which he says little, is "pub-
lic control," and he notes that in characterizing this as a regulatory
model, he is "defining 'regulation' broadly .... -133 He offers as an exam-
ple the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"), "a massive government-run
electrification and flood-control program."134 Unlike the other three reg-
ulatory models, which presumed a private sphere to some extent sepa-
rate from a public sphere, the TVA "involved an unprecedented rejection
of private enterprise" 13 5 and, in the words of one scholar, "adopt[ed]
forthrightly the principle of public development, ownership, and opera-
tion .. ,,136 In other words, under the public-control model, the public
sphere essentially absorbs or supplants the private sphere and all signif-
124. See Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
125. See Ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), invalidated in part by U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936).
126. See Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (2000)).
127. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1192.
128. Id. at 1253.
129. Id. at 1192.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1247.
132. Gifford, supra n. 123, at 303.
133. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1193.
134. Id. at 1247. For a short history of the TVA, see Roscoe C. Martin, The Tennessee
Valley Authority: A Study of Federal Control, 22 L. & Contemp. Probs. 351 (1957). For a
discussion of the TVA's legal framework, see Richard Wirtz, The Legal Framework of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 573 (1976).
135. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1294.
136. Martin, supra n. 134, at 354.
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icant decisions are made by public officials who pursue public policy
objectives 13 7 rather than by private individuals who pursue personal
objectives in the market.1 38
For purposes of this Article, there are three additional points to note
about Rabin's typology of regulatory models. First, although he de-
scribes the regulatory models diachronically as a series of historical
stages or innovations, he recognizes that the models can be deployed syn-
chronically as analytical tools. For example, although the New Deal
ushered in an era of market-corrective regulation, the New Deal also
continued to see the creation of agencies such as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") that emphasized the policing model.' 39 The
policing model also reemerges, according to Rabin, in the 1970s during
the "Public Interest Era" of regulation with the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969140 ("NEPA") and the Clean Air Amendments of
1970141 ("CAA"), among other regulatory schemes. 14 2 Thus, as shown
below, 143 one can use Rabin's models as analytical constructs to illumi-
nate certain aspects of existing regulatory structures such as, for exam-
ple, the U.S. Internet privacy regime, regardless of the particular point
in history at which these structures originated.
A second important feature of Rabin's typology of regulatory models
is that each of them is embedded in, and justifies itself by reference to, a
broader account of the life of the community, including in particular an
137. Professor Martin noted, id. at 370, that the TVA's main policy objectives can be
found in a list of areas in which the Tennessee Valley Authority Act instructs the President
to recommend legislation as needed to promote:
(1) the maximum amount of flood control; (2) the maximum development of said
Tennessee River for navigation purposes; (3) the maximum generation of electric
power consistent with flood control and navigation; (4) the proper use of marginal
lands; (5) the proper method of reforestation of all lands in said drainage basin
suitable for reforestation; and (6) the economic and social well-being of the people
living in said river basin.
16 U.S.C. § 831v (1952).
138. Illustrating the extent to which the TVA operated independently of the market for
electric power in the 1950s, Professor Martin noted that "the average residential use of
electricity in the TVA area in 1956 was double the national average, while the cost was
quite considerably less than half - 1.16 cents per kilowatt-hour for the TVA region as com-
pared with 2.62 cents for the nation." Martin, supra n. 134, at 365. The TVA also evolved
into a major player in the private market for electric power. According to Professor Wirtz,
by 1975 the TVA sold (less than) 40 percent of its electricity to other government agencies
and "private industrial firms" that, one presumes, could have bought electricity from other
sources if the price were right. Wirtz, supra n. 134, at 582.
139. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1247.
140. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982)).
141. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982)).
142. For Rabin's discussion of NEPA and the CAA, see Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1284-
1295.
143. See infra Section 0.
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account of the extent to which "private" people and organizations do or
do not need significant "public" oversight or control in order to pursue
their affairs and interactions successfully. The common law tort regula-
tory model presumes that individuals and organizations can conduct
their affairs and interactions successfully without significant external
assistance but that they occasionally need, and will call on, the services
of a particular set of public institutions, i.e., courts of law, to resolve dis-
putes that may arise. The policing model also presumes that individuals
and organizations can and do successfully pursue their affairs and inter-
actions without significant outside assistance, but that overly aggressive
competitive behavior by particular individuals and organizations may re-
quire active intervention by public institutions to restore the successful
functioning of the community of individuals, understood as a market.
Where the common law tort and policing models see the market estab-
lished by the actions of individuals and organizations as largely but not
entirely self-sufficient and self-regulating, the market-corrective and
public-control models see this same market as intrinsically deficient and
disordered, if not self-destructive, without substantial external assis-
tance and direction. The market-corrective model allows some opportu-
nities for individuals and organizations to conduct their own affairs and
interactions, but only under the supervision of public officials dedicated
to alleviating potential deficiencies and disorder. By contrast, the pub-
lic-control model gives public administrators command over all affairs
and interactions that individuals and organizations might have under-
taken on their own in a particular field or sector, thereby seeking to elim-
inate any deficiencies that otherwise might have arisen and any disorder
that might have occurred.
A third important point to note is that each of Rabin's regulatory
models reflects a different degree of reliance on, or faith in, agency exper-
tise. Under the common law tort model, judges are not expected to be
experts in the economic sectors and fields of activity over which they hold
sway. 144 On the contrary, as Karl Llewellyn wrote in his distinctive
style,
we have a legal system which entrusts its case-law-making to a body
who are specialists only in being unspecialized, in being the official de-
positaries of as much general and balanced but rather uninformed
horse sense as can be mustered. Such a body has as its function to be
instructed, case by case, by the experts in any specialty, and then, by
combination of its very nonexpertness in the particular with its general
and widely buttressed expert roundness in many smatterings, to reach
a judgment which adds balance not only... against the passing flurries
144. Rabin does not discuss the expertise of common law courts under his first regula-
tory model, but their relative absence of expertise regarding particular economic sectors or
the operation of the marketplace generally is a clear implication of his typology.
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of public passion, but no less against the often deep but too often jug-
handled contributions of any technicians. 14 5
Under the policing model, regulatory expertise assumes greater im-
portance. The establishment of the ICC reflected a belief that informed
regulators could police the rail industry and eliminate cutthroat behav-
ior that threatened the industry's economic health. 146 The first chair-
man of the ICC was a law professor and not a railroad specialist.' 4 7
Under his stewardship, the ICC adopted a "case-by-case approach" 148 to
the application of the IC Act instead of "developing its own railroad pol-
icy.' 49 The legal regime for the second major federal agency - the FTC -
provides an even better illustration of the role of expertise under a polic-
ing model. The FTC Act originally authorized the FTC to police "unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce" and later empowered
the FTC to combat "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" affecting most
areas of interstate commerce. 150 FTC commissioners did not have to ac-
quire or possess expertise in a particular industry, such as railroading,
but they did have to develop expertise in adapting their organic statute
to the facts of specific cases arising in many different sectors of private
industry. The FTC's objective has been to police the market for viola-
tions of the FTC Act, not to manage the market after the fashion of a
market-corrective agency.
By contrast, New Deal regulation based on the market-corrective
model demonstrated a "faith in the ability of experts to develop effective
solutions to the economic disruptions created by the market system."15 1
As Rabin notes, sometime in 1938, Harvard Law professor and Dean,
FTC Commissioner, and SEC Chairman James Landis provided a ring-
145. Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 263 (Little, Brown
& Company 1960).
146. The Hoogenbooms describe the railroad practices that led to calls for regulation as
well as the political compromises that led to creation of the ICC. Hoogenboom, supra n.
119, at 1-17.
147. Id. at 19 (discussing the background of Thomas M. Cooley). As a historical matter,
it is interesting to note that Congress dramatically expanded the power of the ICC begin-
ning in the early 1900s, id. at 46-118, and it could be argued that the ICC mutated from a
policing agency into a market-corrective agency in Rabin's typology.
148. Id. at 25.
149. Id.
150. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). For a discussion of the evolu-
tion of the FTC's approach to deceptive advertising, see Patricia P. Bailey & Michael Pert-
schuk, The Law of Deception: The Past As Prologue, 33 Am. U.L. Rev. 849 (1984).
151. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1266; see also James 0. Freedman, Expertise and the Ad-
ministrative Process, 28 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 364 (1976) (New Dealers shared "a commit-
ment to expertise as a principal justification for the administrative process."). Richard
Hofstadter has provided a useful, if overly laudatory, history of the emergence of the "ex-
pert" as a key actor in the U.S. government. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in
American Life 197-229 (Alfred A. Knopf 1979).
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ing defense of administration by experts.1 5 2 According to Landis, "the
art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its op-
eration, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may
dictate . . . and the power through enforcement to realize conclusions as
to policy."1 5 3 Landis's assertion reflects Professor Gifford's contention
that "under the conventional wisdom, administrators were said to pos-
sess expertise developed from their experience in regulating as well as
from their ability to draw on their staff of technicians." 15 4 For Landis,
the New Deal market-corrective regulatory model demands a "public/pri-
vate managerial partnership"155 in which government administrative
experts assume many key managerial tasks, thereby preventing or cor-
recting the mistakes that private managers might make if allowed to op-
erate in a free market or a market subject only to the limited oversight
typical of the policing model of regulation. 156
Although Rabin does not spell out the point, it is useful to note that
the public-control model represents the next logical step in the direction
of reliance on administrative expertise. Instead of public experts and
private owners working together to manage the market, public officials
simply assume ownership and/or control of the relevant enterprise and
their expertise becomes an important, if not the primary, basis for all
decisions about how the enterprise will operate. 15 7 If legislators had en-
tertained serious doubts about the expert capacity of the TVA to engage
in "comprehensive governmental planning as a tool for developing a so-
cial infrastructure in a regional economy suffering from perpetual de-
pression," 158 it seems unlikely that they would have created the TVA in
the first place. Thus, the public-control model appears to presume the
highest level of agency expertise as a basis for eliminating the private
152. James Landis, The Administrative Process (Greenwood Press 1938). For a critical
discussion of Landis's work, see Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Pro-
cess, 78 Harv. L. Rev 319 (1964).
153. Landis, supra n. 152, at 23-24.
154. Gifford, supra n. 123, at 306.
155. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1267.
156. Summarizing the mindset of influential New Deal leaders such as Rexford Tug-
well, Professor Conkin writes: "Guided by expert planners, disciplined by long-range eco-
nomic goals, the government should make the important management decisions for the
whole economy and not be content to act as a mere referee. Allocation of resources, priori-
ties in production, profits, wages, prices - all should be determined by government in be-
half of the whole nation. .. ." Conkin, supra n. 123, at 35. Conkin points out, however, that
President Roosevelt never endorsed Tugwell's vision of a planned economy. Id. at 36.
157. According to Professor Martin, the TVA administers many of its programs in coop-
eration with state and local governments and private industry, and "the chief commodity
the TVA has to offer is the technical knowledge and competence of its staff." Martin, supra
n. 134, at 372.
158. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1253.
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sector from the decision-making process.1 59
C. THE U.S. INTERNET PRIVACY REGIME AND THE POLICING MODEL
This section of the Article employs Rabin's typology of regulatory
models to develop a richer account of the socio-economic premises of the
U.S. Internet privacy regime, focusing first on the U.S. regime's treat-
ment of adult PII and then on its treatment of children's PII. In both
contexts, this section argues that the U.S. regime reflects a policing
model rather than a market-corrective or public-control model. The sec-
tion then explores the implications of attempting to understand and pro-
tect the privacy of PII through the policing model, focusing on the
significance of the presumption that there exists an autonomous private
sphere in which individuals trade PHI via a market that requires admin-
istrative oversight.
1. Privacy Regime for Adults - Pure Policing
The U.S. Internet privacy regime for adults is easily classified under
Rabin's typology of regulatory methods. Before the FTC became involved
in regulation of Internet privacy, there was essentially no Internet pri-
vacy regime for adults - or children - in the United States. To the extent
that there were any legal protections for PII moving over the Internet,
they arose under tort law and thus would have fit into Rabin's private
property/tort regulatory model.1 60 As discussed above,16 ' in the mid-
159. The purpose of this discussion is not to defend or criticize reliance on experts in
general or the particular level of reliance found in any of the four regulatory models. The
objective is solely to show that administrative expertise becomes an increasingly important
presumption as one moves from the relatively "weaker" regulatory models - common law
tort and policing - to the relatively "stronger" models - market-corrective and public-con-
trol. Professor Jaffe wrote two classic articles expressing skepticism about the wisdom of
relying on the supposed expertise of administrators. Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of
the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1954) and Louis L.
Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1183 (1973). Professors
Getman and Goldberg provided a detailed critique of claims about the National Labor Rela-
tion Board's expertise in assessing the coercive impact of employer or union conduct on
employee behavior. Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board
Expertise, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev.. 681 (1972). For general discussions of the literature criticiz-
ing the theory of agency expertise, see Gifford, supra n. 123, at 312-319, and Freedman,
supra n. 151, at 367-375.
160. Louis Brandeis initiated the discussion of the right to privacy and its protection
under tort law in 1890. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). For an interesting history of the academic discussions provoked
by the Brandeis article, see David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellec-
tual History of Tort Law, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 769 (1991). Dean Prosser provided a
now-canonical account of the four basic privacy torts. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.
L. Rev. 383 (1960). Professor Bloustein among others criticized Dean Prosser's approach
but failed to dislodge it from the canon, perhaps because Prosser also authored the canoni-
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1990s, the FTC began developing a regime for protection of Internet pri-
vacy under Section 5 of the FTC Act based on the FTC's long-standing
authority to regulate misleading and deceptive advertising. According to
Rabin, the FTC is an archetype of the policing agency.162 Thus, it is rea-
sonable to treat the U.S. Internet privacy regime for adult PII as a polic-
ing regime in Rabin's sense, and to examine the basic elements of the
U.S. regime in light of Rabin's policing model. By contrast, it would be
difficult to make the case that the U.S. regime reflects a market-correc-
tive approach in Rabin's terms, because of the relatively minimal level of
FTC intervention in the ongoing exchanges of PIH among individuals and
other actors. A fortiori, the U.S. regime could not be described as public-
control regulation, because it is clear that the FTC has not assumed
TVA-like control or ownership of the production and sale of PII.
As the policing model suggests, the FTC's approach to Internet pri-
vacy presumes and reflects a relatively clear dichotomy between a pri-
vate sphere and a public sphere. The private sphere is understood to
consist of individual adults who, as it were, produce PII and then trade
PII with other private actors - businesses, organizations, other individu-
als - via the Internet in much the same way that one might produce and
trade wool or wheat. Thus, the relationship of the individual to his or
her PII is analogous to the relationship of the individual to a commodity
that he or she might produce and thereby own or possess. I am tall,
male, gay, 46 years old, and a law professor and thus, qua actor in the
private sphere. I am therefore deemed to own, or at least exercise, a le-
gally protected interest in 1 63 each of these items of PII about myself. As
a commodity, an individual's PIH is alienable. Of course, I cannot sell my
tallness per se, but I can sell, or at least grant authority to use, PII about
my height to other interested actors in the private sphere. The other
party wishes to obtain the use of this PHI for his or her own purposes and
is prepared to trade something of value to me for the opportunity to use
my PII. Under the policing model, the network of such exchanges be-
tween and among actors in the private sphere constitutes a market or a
portion of the broader market for goods and services. Thus, a key pre-
mise of the policing model is the existence of a market in which an indi-
cal hornbook. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964); W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts 849-869 (5th ed., West 1984).
161. See supra n. 64-89 (and accompanying text).
162. See supra n. 120-122 (and accompanying text).
163. As a matter of black letter intellectual property law, "the United States does not
recognize any substantial ownership right in a collection of data." Ronald Mann & Jane
Winn, supra n. 62, at 380. Thus, it is more accurate to say that the FTC has recognized a
legally protected interest in PHI under Section 5. For a summary of the distinctive features
of information as a form of property, see id. at 380-381.
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vidual may agree to exchange particular items of PII under specified
terms for things that the individual values more than the PII. For exam-
ple, I might provide my email address to Amazon.com in exchange for
Amazon.com's promise to notify me whenever a new book by Paul Rus-
sell is published.
In the context of exchanges in the market, particular items of an
individual's PII acquire a price, and this price becomes the value of those
items within the market.' 6 4 Assuming that the market is functioning
properly, information about my height or my sexual orientation is worth
what the market will pay for it. Of course, information about my height
or my sexual orientation may have special value to me, and I can refuse
to trade this PII except at my price. But until I find a buyer in the mar-
ket who is prepared to pay "my" price, my PII will not circulate in the
market and could be said to have no market value. Once I have found a
buyer for my PII, "my" price is the buyer's price, and the value of my PII
is that assigned by a market in which this buyer could have purchased
other commodities from other individuals and I could have sold my PIH to
other potential buyers for other possible prices. Thus, while my PII may
retain an idiosyncratic value for me, that value has little or no signifi-
cance in the private sphere except insofar as it leads to an agreement on
a market price at which my PII can circulate.
An individual's PII can have a market value only because the mar-
ket treats PII as a commodity that, at least in principle, can circulate
freely, a commodity in which the individual has a legally protected inter-
est. Moreover, the individual's protected interest in this commodity is
his or her ticket to participate in the market. Insofar as every online
transaction requires an individual to authorize use of some items of PII
such as name, address, and possibly a credit card number, an individual
who was unable to or refused to exchange such information under any
circumstances would be excluded from the online marketplace. Other ac-
tors in the market would be unable to identify him or her as a particular
individual. Amazon.com cannot determine that it is this particular indi-
vidual who ordered the Penguin edition of Middlemarch without several
items of this individual's PII. The individual who has no PII to trade, or
who refuses to trade PII, is indistinguishable from other individuals and
thus in an important sense has no individual existence, at least from the
perspective of the market in Rabin's private sphere. Thus, the individu-
ality of the individual within the private sphere seems to depend in part
upon the individual's ability and willingness to circulate PII as a
commodity.
164. For a general discussion of the role of prices in a competitive market, see Richard
A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 4-10 (6th ed., Aspen 2003).
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It was remarked above that from the perspective of the policing
model of regulation, an individual's PII is worth what the market will
pay for it if the market is functioning properly. If the market malfunc-
tions, the source of value for PII in the private sphere does not change,
but the price paid in particular instances might be incorrectly high or
low. It is to confront and diminish the possibility of such a market mal-
function that the policing model may assign the public sphere a role. In
the field of Internet privacy, the FTC represents or embodies the public
sphere. As entailed by the policing model, the premise of the FTC's ap-
proach to Internet privacy is that an overly aggressive competitor in the
private sphere occasionally will exceed acceptable limits on market be-
havior. In particular, such a competitor may provide false or misleading
information to individuals about how their PII will be used, thereby in-
ducing individuals to exchange or sell PII that they perhaps otherwise
would not have exchanged or sold had they known how their PII in fact
would be used. Returning to the language of the market for PII, one
might say that individuals thus deceived have sold their PII at an incor-
rect price because they were misled about the terms of the sale. In order
to prevent such situations from arising, Section 5 of the FTC Act 165 tasks
the FTC with deterring false and misleading claims by aggressive com-
petitors and thereby ensuring that the market's pricing mechanism func-
tions properly, i.e., that an individual has the opportunity to exchange
his or her PII at his or her preferred price on terms that are stated in a
truthful and non-misleading manner. 16 6
As MacIntyre and Rabin have noted, the administrative state typi-
cally justifies intervention in the private sphere by claiming expertise
not shared by private actors. Under the policing model, officials are as-
sumed to be knowledgeable about the sorts of excessively competitive be-
haviors that could undermine the self-regulating operation of the
market. However, officials are not thought to know better than the mar-
ket itself or the participants in the market how to allocate whatever may
be traded in a properly functioning market. 16 7 As the policing model en-
tails, FTC Commissioners and staff possess, or are thought to possess,
considerable expertise in policing deceptive and misleading claims in ad-
vertising. Accordingly, the FTC assumes ultimate responsibility for en-
suring that any claims or representations made by website operators
165. See supra n. 64-67 (and accompanying text).
166. Not surprisingly, some scholars have argued market disciplines would suffice to
prevent many, if not all false and misleading claims and that the FTC's authority in this
area may be superfluous. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 47, 61-70 (1969).
167. By contrast, under the market-corrective model, officials are generally thought to
know better than the market itself or the participants how to allocate the commodities
traded.
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concerning collection and use of PII are neither deceptive nor misleading.
But FTC personnel are not thought to possess and presumably do not
possess special expertise regarding the proper terms for collection and
use of PII. One might say the FTC presumes that each informed individ-
ual is sufficiently expert to consent (or not) to the collection and use of
his or her own PH1 according to his or her own scheme of values, and
certainly no less expert or qualified than the FTC itself. By eschewing
any further authority to dictate rules that would overrule the individ-
ual's consent, the FTC, representing the public sphere, excludes itself
from the private sphere in which informed individuals produce and con-
sent to exchange their PII. The U.S. regime thus protects the privacy of
PII in significant part by ensuring that PII remains subject only to the
accurately informed consent of the individual transacting through a self-
regulating market in a properly functioning private sphere, and not sub-
ject to prevaricating private actors or inexpert government officials.
2. Administering the Market for PII
Before reexamining the U.S. Internet privacy regime's treatment of
children's PII in light of Rabin's administrative models, it may be useful
to pause and try to focus on the strangeness - at least to a non-economist
- of the basic premise of the policing model as applied to PII. How and
why has it come to pass that we treat PII as a commodity and the space
within which PII circulates as a market? Given the ubiquity of P11, is it
correctly seen as a "valuable (meaning scarce as well as desired) re-
source,"1 68 and if it is not a valuable resource in this sense, how can
there be a market for it? Is it appropriate that the value of the informa-
tion that forms an individual's identity is a market price, a value that
arises only in comparisons with other commodities that also circulate in
a market? And what if people do not view the PII they provide to a web-
site operator as a valuable resource sold for a price? Does this mean we
have a market with inadequate information or no market at all? No
doubt someone would respond to these questions - correctly - that Rabin
and the originators of the policing model did not invent an electronic
market for PII. Rather, the electronic market for PII arose spontane-
ously with the development of the Internet as parties addressed the
problems involved in transacting at a distance. The FTC responded in a
policing mode when the emerging market for PII began to malfunction.
Thus, the policing model reflected and responded to the realities of the
Internet. But this response begs a key question. Does the fact that indi-
viduals may make available items of PII on the Internet in the course of
their activities entail that there is a market for PII and does it follow
that there should be such a market? The policing model presumes the
168. Posner, supra n. 164, at 33.
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existence of an independent, autonomous market. Those operating
within the terms of the model employ the conceptual apparatus outlined
in the previous subsection to interpret the fact that people make availa-
ble information about themselves on the Internet. Even if this supposed
market for PII lacks any intrinsic justification, the policing model would
not, and indeed could not, question the existence of the market because
the model presumes the existence of such a market and interprets the
behavior of people in light of that presumption. The market is, therefore,
not given as a fact but rather is an interpretation of human action and
interaction.
But the point is not simply that the policing model cannot call into
question its own premises - a somewhat obvious if easily overlooked
point. Rather, the point is that by taking the existence of a malfunction-
ing market for PIH as a premise, the policing model of Internet privacy
regulation actively supports the creation and expansion of a properly
functioning market for PII. So while people clearly began making PII
available online spontaneously, such making available quickly comes to
be understood as a market - albeit a malfunctioning market - in the
context of demands for, and the establishment of, a policing regulatory
regime. In response, the FTC took upon itself the task of making this
market function properly, i.e., of ensuring that people make PII available
online only in the context of a properly functioning market for PII. Thus,
the market for PIH is both the premise, the raw material, and the conclu-
sion, the final product, of the regulatory regime.
Moreover, because the market is the premise and conclusion of the
regulatory regime, the regime tends to require and reinforce a particular
understanding of privacy among regulators and regulated. Privacy
comes to mean the assurance that the market is pricing PHI properly.
The privacy of my PIH is protected in a legal sense if and apparently only
if the terms on which the PII might be collected and used, i.e., the price
broadly conceived, are not false or misleading. To violate my privacy
means to induce me to circulate my PIH at the wrong price, i.e., under
terms and conditions different from those to which I would have con-
sented had I not been misinformed about how my PII would be collected
and used. The FTC protects my privacy by seeking to ensure that overly
aggressive competitors do not induce me to consent to circulate my PII at
the wrong price. My privacy seems to depend, therefore, upon the pre-
sumption that in principle there always will be a right price for my PII, a
market price at which I would trade items of my PI1 to other actors in the
private sphere. Thus, the market is a conclusion of the policing model in
the sense that under the U.S. Internet privacy regime my privacy is as-
sured only insofar as my PII is treated as a commodity trading in a prop-
erly functioning market. The significance of this point will become
clearer after the discussion of the rather different treatment that the
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U.S. privacy regime affords to a child's PII.169
The market is not, however, the only premise or the only conclusion
of the policing model. As discussed above, the continuing operation of
the private sphere demands the watchful presence of a particular type of
public sphere, i.e., one tasked with preventing private actors from behav-
ing in an overly aggressive manner that could undermine the autono-
mous operation of the private sphere. Thus, the need for a certain type
of public sphere is also a premise of the policing model, and not surpris-
ingly, once the model is accepted, the call for action by such a public
sphere becomes the self-reinforcing conclusion of the analysis. In respect
to PII, while the individual comes to understand privacy as the assur-
ance that he or she can make PII available on a properly functioning
market, the individual simultaneously comes to recognize that his or her
privacy depends on the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency com-
mitted to maintaining such a properly functioning market. Thus, a de-
mand for enhanced privacy protection inevitably manifests itself as a
demand for more public action by an agency such as the FTC.
3. Privacy Regime for Children - More Privacy, More Administration
As discussed above, the decision to adopt COPPA reflected a deter-
mination by the FTC and Congress that the Internet posed a special risk
to the privacy of children's PII.17 0 Faced with this supposed risk, Con-
gress could have adopted a range of legal responses, including an out-
right ban on the collection and use of children's PII or an elaborate legal
and administrative regime of the sort found in the European Union. 17 1
But Congress took no such steps. Instead, Congress adopted a regime
that remains well within the conceptual structure of the policing model
of regulation. Indeed, a brief reexamination of COPPA will show how
the conceptual structure of the policing model produced an approach to
privacy protection that simultaneously extends the scope of the market
for PII and expands, within relatively clear limits, the role of
administration.
COPPA addressed a recent development in the realm of human be-
havior: with the advent of the Internet, a website operator can collect PII
directly from a young child without making any commitments to protect
the information or hold it in confidence. COPPA responds to this devel-
opment on two levels, reflecting the policing model's division of the world
into an autonomous private sphere and a policing public sphere. At the
level of the private sphere, COPPA treats collection of PII from young
169. See infra Section 0.
170. See supra Section 0.
171. See Ronald Mann & Jane Winn , supra n. 62, at 209-212 (briefly describing the
European regime).
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children as a source of malfunction or potential malfunction in the pric-
ing mechanism of the market for PII. The market malfunction is that
website operators might collect PII from children who are too young to
appreciate the value of the PII that they make available or to understand
the terms on which the website proposes to collect and use the PII. Be-
cause the child cannot grasp the value of her PII or the significance of
the terms of use, the child may agree to make the PII available at a price
that differs from the price the website operator would have paid to obtain
the same sorts of PII from an adult. To correct this market malfunction,
COPPA requires a website operator who wishes to collect PII from chil-
dren under 13 years of age to provide specific information to the child's
parent about the use(s) that will be made of the child's PII and to obtain
verifiable consent from the child's parent before collecting and using the
child's PII.172 By empowering the parent to evaluate the proposed terms
for collection and use of a child's PII, COPPA in effect authorizes the
parent to set the market price for the child's PII. COPPA thereby forces
the website operator to deal with the parent, rather than the child, over
that price. Thus, COPPA protects the privacy of a child's PII by seeking
to ensure that that PIH is made available only at the "correct" price, de-
fined here to mean the price that the child would have demanded in the
market for PII if the child had possessed the capabilities of her adult
parent.
In order to implement these changes at the level of the private
sphere, COPPA also makes changes at the level of the public sphere.
Specifically, COPPA empowers the FTC to enforce the new information
and consent requirements that COPPA imposes on website operators.
COPPA accomplishes this by declaring violations of the new require-
ments to be violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 1 73 By tying COPPA to
Section 5, Congress affirmed that COPPA did not grant the FTC a new
kind of authority to intervene in the market but rather enhanced or clar-
ified the FTC's existing authority to deter false and misleading claims -
an archetypal form of policing regulation. And this is not simply an ex-
ample of Congress deciding to call a duck a chicken. Rather, it is an
accurate characterization of the FTC's task under COPPA, i.e., ensuring
that the market functions properly in establishing a price for children's
PII by ensuring that adult individuals receive truthful and non-mislead-
ing information about how the PIH will be collected and used. Indeed, the
fact that Congress chose to characterize its actions in COPPA as an en-
hancement of the FTC's authority under Section 5 reveals the degree to
which Congress understood the problem of information privacy on the
Internet as a problem of market malfunction to which expanding the
172. See supra n. 100-104 (and accompanying text).
173. See supra n. 90-92, 113 (and accompanying text).
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FTC's authority over false and misleading claims represented a reasona-
ble and seemingly obvious response. Thus, even if one believes that Con-
gress called a duck a chicken when it treated information privacy on the
Internet as a problem of market malfunction, Congress probably did so
because it thought the duck was a chicken.
It is now possible to link this discussion of COPPA to a broader point
made above about the impact of the policing model's conceptual frame-
work. When Congress confronted the evidence that website operators
were collecting PII from children, Congress saw a threat to children's
privacy. But within the conceptual framework of the policing model, this
threat appeared both as a market problem in the private sphere, and an
administrative problem in the public sphere. Consistent with the polic-
ing model, Congress took two inextricably linked steps. On the one
hand, Congress expanded the existing market for PII, a market that by
hypothesis was functioning properly under FTC oversight, to include
children's PII. Congress thereby officially recognized a market for chil-
dren's PII where before there had been no such recognition and arguably
no such market. On the other hand, because administrative oversight is
a precondition of a properly functioning market in the policing model,
Congress enhanced, albeit in a carefully limited way, the existing admin-
istrative authority to meet the needs of the newly expanded market.
Thus, COPPA illustrates very well the earlier point that the market for
PII and the administration of that market are the premises and the con-
clusions of any analysis under the policing model. A child's PII comes to
be seen as a commodity with a price, and a child's parent comes to hold a
legally protected interest in distribution of that commodity to website
operators in the market. As the administrator of the market, the FTC
comes to be seen as the guarantor of the parent's ability to exercise that
ownership interest or legal control.
It is useful at this point to consider two counterarguments to the
claim that COPPA follows the policing model of regulation. According to
the first counterargument, COPPA is actually a market-corrective re-
gime because COPPA presumes that the market alone will not produce
sufficient information to protect the privacy of children's PII. Rabin
stated that market-corrective regimes often contain an information-shar-
ing requirement, 174 and one could argue that COPPA's notice rules es-
tablish just such a requirement, thus transforming the FTC's policing
regime under Section 5 of the FTC Act into a market-corrective regime.
Although this counterargument focuses attention on a key element of
COPPA, it misconstrues the significance of that element. COPPA's re-
quirements clearly seek to correct a perceived failure of the market to
produce sufficient information for adult individuals concerning the use
174. See supra n. 130 (and accompanying text).
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that websites make of children's PI. But the "market failure" that
COPPA addresses is the possibility that website operators can communi-
cate directly with small children via the Internet, cutting parents out of
the loop. At bottom, COPPA is designed to ensure that a responsible
adult, the parent, stands between the website operator and a child who is
too young to understand the implications of providing PII to a website
and who lacks the legal capacity to enter a contract and thereby partici-
pate in a market.1 7 5 Thus, as suggested above, COPPA actually creates
a market where one might not otherwise exist - a market involving web-
sites and their operators on one side and adult individuals with children
on the other.
From the standpoint of Rabin's typology of regulatory methods, the
issue of whether COPPA is a policing regime or a market-corrective re-
gime turns not on the presence or absence of an information-sharing re-
quirement. It instead turns on the degree to which the public sphere,
here the FTC, intervenes in the functioning of the private sphere, here
the market for PII. COPPA does require website operators to share more
information with a parent than they otherwise might share, but unlike a
typical market-corrective regime in Rabin's analysis, COPPA does not
mandate "information sharing" between competitors 176 in a way that en-
courages cooperation rather than competition in the market. Moreover,
with respect to this information-sharing requirement, the FTC's primary
function is not to encourage cooperation, but to police compliance and
thereby encourage robust competition within an independent private
sphere.
A second counterargument in favor of the view that COPPA is a
market-corrective regime, focuses not on particular COPPA require-
ments but on COPPA's increased reliance on agency expertise. COPPA
175. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.2 (4th ed., Aspen 2004).
176. Rabin is more than a little vague about what he means by "information-sharing"
requirements. At one point, he refers to "private information-sharing agreements and con-
solidation efforts" as a Progressive initiative to protect against the harsh effects of competi-
tion. Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1225. Rabin also quotes FTC historian Gerald Henderson to
the effect that trade associations at one point sought permission to share cost and price
information among members as a less expensive alternative to costly industry consolida-
tion. Id. at 1223; see Henderson, supra n. 120, at 21-22. In addition, Rabin mentions the
New Deal objectives of "eliminating price competition, and fostering intra-industry cooper-
ation ... to restore business confidence." Rabin, supra n. 116, at 1248. These admittedly
disjointed comments suggest that in Rabin's view, the information-sharing provisions typi-
cal of a market-corrective regime are intended to permit or force companies to share cost,
pricing, and other market information with the government and with one another to foster
cooperation rather than potentially ruinous competition. Information sharing with con-
sumers, though perhaps desirable, is a secondary goal from the standpoint of a market-
corrective regime, a goal arguably more closely related to traditional "policing" concerns
about false and misleading information.
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requires 17 7 the FTC to adopt implementing regulations under Section
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 1 7s Section 553 mandates use
of "notice and comment" procedures that are designed, according to Pro-
fessor Schwartz, to "educate the agency, thereby helping to ensure in-
formed rulemaking. The APA sought to ensure that the broadest base of
information would be provided by those most interested and informed on
the subject of the rulemaking at hand.1 79 In other words, one might say
that "notice and comment" procedures are supposed to give the agency
an opportunity to acquire sufficient expertise to promulgate regulations
and thereby exercise a measure of control over an industry beyond that
typically associated with the policing model. Since COPPA requires "no-
tice and comment" rulemaking, it seems to follow that COPPA must de-
mand a degree of agency expertise beyond that demanded by Section 5 of
the FTC Act and the policing model. As Rabin has shown, increased reli-
ance on agency expertise in regulating the private sector is an important
element of the market-corrective model.18 0
It would be a mistake, however, to overestimate the extent to which
COPPA's grant of rulemaking authority demands or relies on FTC exper-
tise. In fact, COPPA lays out in considerable detail the substantive con-
tent of the regulation the FTC was required to adopt, leaving the FTC
relatively little leeway to fashion additional substantive require-
ments. 18 1 To date, the FTC has focused most of its rulemaking resources
under COPPA on determining what sort of technical mechanism a Web
site operator should be required to use to obtain verifiable parental con-
sent - e.g., a written response on paper, a toll-free telephone number, an
email with an electronic signature, or some combination of these.'8 2 No
one would dispute that the FTC has developed some expertise on this
important but very narrow and technical topic. Moreover, it is clear that
expertise on the technical mechanisms of consent differs from expertise
on whether advertising is false or misleading under Section 5 of the FTC
Act. Thus, implementing COPPA has resulted in a broadening of the
FTC's expertise as well as reliance on that broadened expertise. Pre-
sumably, however, no one would argue that expertise on consent mecha-
nisms would equip the FTC to second-guess decisions made by Web sites
177. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1) (2000).
178. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
179. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 194 (3d ed., Little Brown & Company
1991)(footnotes omitted).
180. See supra n. 151-154 (and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of agency
expertise in the market-corrective model).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (2000).
182. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 2580 (proposed Jan.
14, 2005)(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312); Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/04/050420coppafinalrule.pdf (Apr. 21, 2005)(to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 312).
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and/or parents concerning the terms on which a child's PII will be col-
lected and used, i.e., decisions concerning the appropriate "price" of a
child's PII in the market. Because the kind of expertise required by
COPPA apparently does not equip the FTC to rectify - or claim to rectify
- the terms and conditions assigned by the market, COPPA would not
qualify as market-corrective in Rabin's sense.
V. INTERNET PRIVACY AND THE POST-
ENLIGHTENMENT PARADIGM
This Section reexamines the premises and the significance of the
U.S. Internet privacy regime in light of the outline of the post-Enlighten-
ment paradigm presented in Section II. In particular, this Section shows
that the U.S. regime is built around the three key elements of the para-
digm: (1) the individualization of privacy and the attendant emphasis on
consent, (2) the fundamentally ambivalent market relationship of the in-
dividual to his or her PII, and (3) the overarching need for expert imper-
sonal bureaucratic administration by corporations and public officials.
This Section also shows that the U.S. regime reflects certain fundamen-
tal tensions afflicting each of these elements, as one would expect if
MacIntyre is correct in his argument that post-Enlightenment thought
about human nature and human action reflects the failure of philosophy
to resolve various problems bequeathed by the Enlightenment to later
generations.
A. THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PRIVACY AND THE ROLE OF CONSENT
In Section II it was suggested that, in a world operating under the
post-Enlightenment paradigm, an information-privacy regime would fo-
cus on protecting individuals and enhancing individual consent. The
U.S. Internet privacy regime does focus on individuals and consent.
First, at the level of express legal requirements, the U.S. regime seeks to
protect and enhance the significance of informed adult individual con-
sent by requiring Web site operators to abide by their express privacy
commitments.18 3 Web site operators are free to promise as much or as
little information privacy protection as they wish, and each individual is
free to consent or not to the level of protection offered in light of his or
her scheme of personal values. The law simply requires the Web site
operator to provide the level of protection promised.
Second, at the level of the underlying regulatory model, individuals
and individual consent are the driving forces in a properly functioning
market where PII circulates as a commodity. Since the time of Adam
Smith, it has been understood that each person participates in the mar-
183. See supra n. 64-66 (and accompanying text).
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ket as an individual pursuing his or her self-interest in transactions with
other individuals pursuing their self-interest(s).1 8 4 Qua individual mar-
ket participant, I supply others with things that they value in exchange
for things that I value. In the electronic marketplace, one of the things
about me that others may value is my PII. Thus, as part of a transac-
tion, I may be asked to supply information about my name and address,
my credit card, my personal preferences, and so forth. To facilitate such
trading, the U.S. Internet privacy regime implements the market-based
premises of the policing model by treating my PII as a commodity in
which I have a legally protected interest and over which I may exercise
authority through informed consent to collection and use. In this re-
spect, the U.S. regime treats my PII and its privacy as matters of funda-
mentally individual interest and concern. Indeed, like the PII market
itself, the individualization of interest and concern seems to be both a
premise and a conclusion of the U.S. Internet privacy regime. The re-
gime presumes that each person is unquestionably an individual with
PII to trade in the market and, consequently, the regime empowers each
person as an individual to engage in such trading with some confidence
that the Web site operators with whom the individual trades will live up
to any commitments they have made concerning the privacy protection
they will accord to PII. The individual bears the entire burden of deter-
mining whether a Web site operator's privacy commitments are suffi-
cient in light of the value that the individual personally attaches to PII
and its privacy.
The individualization of interest and concern is not, however, the
entire story. The U.S. Internet privacy regime also presumes that, at the
margins of the market, a person may have a very different status as a
member of a group rather than as an individual. Evidence that the U.S.
Internet privacy regime acknowledges the significance of something
other than the individual who trades PII in a market is not difficult to
find. COPPA presumes that there are persons - i.e., children below the
age of 13 - who should not participate in the market without parental
permission and who should be permitted to trade PII only on terms ap-
proved in advance by a parent. COPPA thus recognizes a child as a
member of a group - i.e., the family - rather than as an individual with
legal authority. COPPA accomplishes this by empowering the parent to
establish the market price of the child's PII. In what sense, then, is the
PII in question the child's PII? The child apparently does not have a
legally protected interest in the PII, because the parent determines
whether and under what terms the PII might be traded. It seems more
accurate to say that under COPPA the child's PII is the parent's PII be-
184. For a summary of Adam Smith's account of the market, see Robert L. Heilbroner,
The Worldly Philosophers 52-56 (4th ed., Simon & Schuster 1972).
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cause the parent exercises the relevant legal interest. COPPA thus ex-
plicitly presupposes a distinction between PII about someone and PIH
that belongs to someone. The information that Christopher is ten, blond,
blue-eyed, and very fond of The Lord of the Rings may be information
about Christopher but from the point of view of COPPA the information
does not belong to Christopher. Rather, it belongs to his parents, who
may approve or disapprove its collection and use on terms offered by Web
site operators.
This seemingly obvious distinction between "PII about X" and "PII
that belongs to X" reveals an important limit or margin of the U.S. In-
ternet privacy regime's focus on the individual. To see why, it is useful to
ask how a parent is supposed to set a price for PII that belongs to, but is
not about, him or her. Clearly the parent cannot set the price by bar-
gaining with the child for the PII. First of all, from a legal perspective,
the PII does not belong to the child, so bargaining with the child is un-
necessary. Moreover, even if the parent were to treat the PIH as though
it belonged to the child, a key premise of COPPA is that the child is not
yet capable of valuing his or her PIH correctly and therefore not qualified
to bargain over PII. This means that one would be hard put to offer a
persuasive market-based account of the transaction(s) between parent
and child concerning PIH about the child. In this respect, COPPA implic-
itly acknowledges that within the family, people typically do not bargain
over PIH as individuals in a market, but take responsibility for PII about
one another in quite a different way.
The family stands at, or just beyond, the margin of the U.S. Internet
privacy regime in the sense that COPPA does not purport to regulate the
way a parent takes responsibility for PH1 about a child. Under COPPA, a
parent may make decisions about such PIH that are entirely self-inter-
ested, i.e., in the self-interest of the parent qua individual market par-
ticipant, and that ignore any supposed interests or concerns of the
parent qua parent. Daddy can sell Christopher's name, address, and
shopping preferences to the highest bidder and pocket the market price.
But COPPA also empowers the parent to act not from self-interest, but in
the interest of the child or the family as a whole by sheltering children
from the impact of the market for PII until the children are, at least in
theory, old enough to participate in that market themselves. Accord-
ingly, Daddy's decisions about whether to permit collection and use of
Christopher's PIH may be - and presumably will be - influenced by pa-
rental interests and concerns that are quite different from the interests
and concerns that influence Daddy's decisions about whether to allow
collection and use of PIH about himself. Following MacIntyre's account of
the old Aristotelian paradigm, one might say that Daddy's decisions do
not reflect his status as an individual, but rather his role as a parent in a
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family with a shared vision of the good of its members.1 8 5 Accordingly,
any criticism of Daddy's decisions likely will focus on his adequacy as a
parent in light of that shared vision and not on the adequacy of his bar-
gaining skills as an individual in the market.
Beyond the field of COPPA, the distinction between "PII about X"
and "PII that belongs to X" points to other non-individualist, non-market
interests and concerns that arguably receive at least tacit recognition at
the margins of the U.S. Internet privacy regime. For example, I know, or
at least have very good reasons to believe, that the man I am dating is
gay. This item of PII seems to be about him. But does it belong to him?
In one sense it does because under Section 5 of the FTC Act he may con-
sent or not to its collection and use by a Web site operator when the
operator seeks to collect the information from him. But what if a Web
site operator somehow asks me for this information? Clearly, I too can
trade this information on the market, and Section 5 apparently would
protect my authority to insist on adherence to any terms offered by the
Web site operator. Thus, from the market's perspective, the information
appears to belong to both of us, even though it is about him. Carrying
the inquiry a step further, if we decide to become boyfriends or partners,
is that information about him or about me or about us? And to whom
does that information belong? The information would seem to be about
both of us or about each of us, only insofar as we have a relationship with
each other. Thus, the statement "X is the boyfriend of Y" is true if and
only if the statement "Y is the boyfriend of X" also is true. And again, it
would seem that each of us or both of us could trade this information on
the market and, under the protections offered by Section 5 of the FTC
Act, each of us could insist on his own price and terms.
At least two important points emerge from this brief discussion.
First, from the perspective of Section 5 of the FTC Act, PII belongs to
whichever adult individual is in a position to trade it on the market, re-
gardless of whether the PII is about the individual, about someone else,
or about a relationship between them. Thus, although in the simplest
scenario, the properly functioning market may ensure that I receive the
appropriate price for PII about me, the market cannot resolve threshold
questions regarding whether and when the P11 that I possess is about me
185. For the classic(al) exposition of this view of the family, written long before the dis-
covery - or invention - of the market by political economists, see Aristotle, Politics, 18-29
(Ernest Barker trans., 1952). In a later statement of the same idea, Hegel argued that the
family bond is based on love and that, because one's family is essential to who one is, "one
is in it not as an independent person but as a member." George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,
Hegel's Philosophy of Right 110 (T. M. Knox trans., Oxford U. Press 1967) (originally pub-
lished 1821). By contrast, in the marketplace, which is part of what Hegel terms "civil
society," people exist not as members of a unit but as individuals who pursue "selfish ends."
Id. at 123.
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and whether or when it belongs to me as an individual participating in a
market.186 Second, by protecting my ability to trade PII about someone
else or about my relationship with someone else, Section 5 of the FTC
Act tacitly recognizes - or at least does not foreclose the possibility - that
I may have to take into account another person's interests and concerns
when determining the price to place on such PIH in the market. Thus,
even though I am not my boyfriend's parent under COPPA, I may have
responsibilities to my boyfriend that affect my handling of PII about him
or us and that are not determined by my interests as an individual in the
market. Such responsibilities seem to escape the conceptual framework
of the post-Enlightenment paradigm. Of course, I can ignore those re-
sponsibilities and/or attempt to treat them as private values that I may
affirm or reject as a sovereign individual, thereby rationalizing a deci-
sion to sell PII about my boyfriend in the market to the highest bidder.
In this way, the post-Enlightenment paradigm might reassert itself.
Section 5 will not foreclose this move because it does not purport to regu-
late my reaction to the responsibilities attending my relationship to my
boyfriend. The old Aristotelian paradigm may help, however, to explain
those responsibilities in a way that the post-Enlightenment paradigm
does not. They are, one might say, defined not by my status as an indi-
vidual exercising sovereignty over my personal values but by my role in a
couple seeking to discover and pursue a shared vision of the good. l8 7
Thus, if I do sell PII about my boyfriend to the highest bidder and my
boyfriend takes umbrage, he is unlikely to chastise me for cutting a bad
deal, i.e., for getting the wrong price. Rather, he will chastise me for
failing to live up to my responsibilities to protect and support him qua
boyfriend. He will denounce me, in short, as a bad boyfriend.
A couple of important caveats should be inserted at this point. First,
the suggestion that adult persons have non-market responsibilities to
and for one another regarding collection and use of PII is, at best, only
implicit in Section 5 of the FTC Act. Unlike COPPA, Section 5 does not
create a legal structure under which PII about one person explicitly falls
under the consensual authority of another person in the market. Rather,
Section 5 leaves open this possibility by remaining silent on the issue.
Second, by remaining silent, Section 5 simply follows the lead of the
properly functioning market that is both its premise and conclusion. The
market has no interest in the influences on the individual that shape the
bargains he or she might make in setting a market price for PII. A per-
son's market behavior can reflect the person's thinking qua parent or
186. Randy Barnett has made the related point that the rules of contract law presup-
pose a theory of entitlements and, in particular, a theory of alienable rights to property.
See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 291-307
(1986).
187. See supra n. 14 & 37 (and accompanying text).
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qua boyfriend or girlfriend, but in the market, the person remains an
individual. The market treats the interests that the person pursues, in-
cluding the privacy interests, as individual interests. One might say
that any shared or communal interests and concerns animated by a
shared vision of the good will disappear from sight in a market viewed
through the lens of the post-Enlightenment paradigm, just as such
shared interests and concerns all but disappear under Section 5, coming
to light only in an examination of the circumstances in which a person
might find himself or herself at the margins of the market. In this re-
spect, the market promotes the individualization of privacy and Section 5
supports the proper functioning of the market.
B. AMBIVALENCE AND DEPERSONALIZATION IN THE MARKET FOR PII
It was suggested in Section 0 that under the post-Enlightenment
paradigm a modern information-privacy regime would reflect the deep
ambivalence of the individual to his or her PII. On the one hand, one
would anticipate that individuals would place a high value on informa-
tion privacy and thus reveal considerable anxiety about maintaining con-
sensual authority over PII. On the other hand, one would expect an
effort to establish and maintain a market that permits the individual to
disseminate PII to the highest bidder. The U.S. Internet privacy regime
appears to reflect precisely this ambivalence. On the one hand, the FTC
developed the U.S. regime as an explicit response to growing evidence of
consumer anxiety about the collection and use of PII via the Internet, l8 8
anxiety presumably rooted in the supposedly high personal value the in-
dividual places on PII. On the other hand, the primary focus of the U.S.
regime, as one would expect under the policing model and the post-En-
lightenment paradigm, is to establish and maintain a properly function-
ing market in which a person can alienate or disseminate PII for a price.
Indeed, in electronic transactions with others, the individual typically
needs those others to recognize the individual as this particular individ-
ual, as the individual with these particular items of PIH that distinguish
him or her from other individuals. It is I who want the Penguin edition
of Middlemarch, and who want it sent to my address after charging the
purchase to my credit card number. Thus, even to establish my identity
in the market as this individual I must be willing to circulate my PII and
cede at least some of my authority over it. The U.S. Internet privacy
regime reflects the individual's ambivalence about his or her PII by seek-
ing to maintain a properly functioning market in which the individual
can sell PII, but only for a price that accurately reflects the supposedly
high value the individual places on PII.
188. See supra n. 71-74 (and accompanying text).
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The ambivalent relationship of the individual to PII under the U.S.
Internet privacy regime becomes even more apparent if one considers the
individual's PII from the perspective of the market. The market's inter-
est in the individual's PII, including the individual's most "personal"
secrets, is fundamentally impersonal and tends to depersonalize PII in at
least two ways. First, the market depersonalizes PII by assigning it a
price. On the market, PII about me - e.g., my name and address, my
credit card number, my telephone number, and my "personal" interests -
may be worth a certain number of dollars and cents to a Web site opera-
tor. But many other people's PII will be worth exactly the same amount
of money. Thus, the market value of my P1I does not reflect anything
unique or personal about me. Indeed, the market value of my PII will
allow me or others to equate it with goods and services available in the
market. Thus, one's PIH might have the same value as a can of FrescaTm
or a package of Scott TM towels. From the perspective of the market, any
idiosyncratic value that I might assign to my PIH is largely irrelevant. Of
course, anxiety about loss of control over PII can drive a person to refuse
to circulate any PII, but from the market's perspective, that means the
person overvalues his or her PII. Eventually, the market may present an
opportunity that is "too good to pass up," and then the person will agree
to treat PII as just another commodity with no more significance than
the market price reflects. Anxiety dispelled.
The market also depersonalizes PII in a second way. Why, one
might ask, does Amazon.com wish to obtain and retain the item of PII
that Mark Kightlinger enjoys reading gay-themed novels? Is it because
some person at Amazon.com headquarters is snickering or taking a pru-
rient interest in my sexual behavior? Viewed through the lens of the
market for PII, the answer to this question clearly is "no". Amazon.com
"cares" about the sexual orientation implicit in my reading habits only
insofar as that item of PII assists Amazon.com in predicting and influ-
encing my future purchases, i.e., my behavior qua consumer in the online
marketplace. Amazon.com seeks only to build a profile of me qua indi-
vidual market actor and to offer to sell things to me that people who
share my characteristics, whatever those may be, happen to buy. In gen-
eral, Web site operators "care" about PIH only insofar as it is a commodity
that can be collected and put to productive use in the purchase and sale
of other commodities. Any further significance that PII about me might
have to me in my personal life or in the formation of my personal identity
is irrelevant. Thus, although a Web site operator may develop a rather
detailed market profile of people like Mark Kightlinger by analyzing PIH
about them, the profile is actually "nothing personal."
It should be clear now that the U.S. Internet privacy regime reflects
a fundamental ambivalence toward the value of P1I. On the one hand,
the rationale for the regime is protection of individual privacy because of
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the supposedly high personal value of PII to individuals and the threat
that misappropriation and misuse of PII may pose. 18 9 On the other
hand, the regime's response is to maintain a properly functioning market
that disseminates all PII for a price and strips PII of any personal signif-
icance. This response accurately reflects a key tenet of the post-Enlight-
enment paradigm: as a set of value-free facts that individuals may or
may not value, an individual's PII has no intrinsic significance. An indi-
vidual may value those facts but that says nothing about their "true"
value because they have no true value. They simply are. Facts may at-
tain value, however, in the market, which is nothing more than a nexus
of evaluation and exchange. The supposedly high value of PII to the in-
dividual is ultimately the price at which the individual will let it go.
Again, however, this is not the entire story. As discussed in Section
V. A, the U.S. Internet privacy regime appears to recognize, at least at
the margins, that PII may have a significance unrelated to market value
in the context of certain groups or relationships, such as the family or the
union of two lovers. In such contexts, the "key tenet" of the post-Enlight-
enment paradigm, i.e., that facts are value-free, arguably is shadowed, or
perhaps haunted, by a different understanding of the significance of PII,
an understanding rooted not in the "values" of individuals facing a value-
free world, but in the shared trust and respect that support disclosure
and discretion between and among members of families, couples, groups,
and communities. In practice, such trust and respect typically would re-
flect an ongoing effort to become a good or better parent, a good or better
son or daughter, a good or better boyfriend, and ultimately a good or
better member of a good or better community. In other words, what
dwells at the margins and what arguably haunts the modern informa-
tion-privacy regime may be the specter of the old quest to find and
achieve a shared vision of the human good or telos, a quest that was sup-
posed to have been interred along with the Aristotelian paradigm some
four hundred years ago. 190
In working to formulate a credible teleological account of our exper-
iences in groups and communities, we would, MacIntyre suggests, formu-
late an account of the "hierarchy of goods which provide the ends of
189. The title of a recent article about identity theft in the ABA Journal illustrates the
supposed high value of PII to the individual. Jason Krause, Stolen Lives, 92 A.B.A. J. 36
(Mar. 2006).
190. MacIntyre argues that the good human life is in part a quest for knowledge of the
human good or telos and self-knowledge of one's character and potential. MacIntyre, After
Virtue, supra n. 10, at 219. He also argues that each of us is a "proto-Aristotelian" before
being educated into other ways of seeing the world. See MacIntyre, supra n. 8, at 146.
Thus, it would not be surprising if we sometimes revert to an Aristotelian framework when
trying to understand and justify our lives.
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human action."19 1 In light of that hierarchy, it might be possible to ex-
plain and defend the true significance - or lack of significance - of partic-
ular categories or items of PII to overcome the fundamental ambivalence
to PII that is a key characteristic of our post-Enlightenment situation.
Indeed, a credible teleological account of human nature might help to
explain the nagging conviction that at least some items of our PII have
intrinsic significance unrelated to market value or the individual's sover-
eign evaluations. For the reasons that MacIntyre outlines, this nagging
conviction is difficult to explain, except as an atavism, within the frame-
work of the post-Enlightenment paradigm. However, the conviction
would be explicable and, perhaps, too obvious to need explanation if a
teleological account of human nature were in fact true.
C. IMPERSONALITY, EXPERTISE, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRIVACY
It was suggested in Section II that an information-privacy regime
operating under the post-Enlightenment paradigm would rely heavily on
administrative bureaucracy as a counterbalance to individual will ex-
pressed in consent, leading to the phenomenon that MacIntyre charac-
terizes as "bureaucratic individualism." In the absence of a shared
vision of the good, unbounded exercise of individual will may engender
disorder and conflict. In the modern world, the "obvious" counterbalance
to the multiplicity of individual needs and values is an impersonal insti-
tution that coordinates or channels such needs and values toward uni-
fied, or at least orderly, ends. The modern business organization is one
such institution. As commentators (including MacIntyre) who follow
Max Weber have noted, the typical modern business organization is, in
key respects, a bureaucracy, and as Professor Mommsen observes, for
Weber "the further advance of capitalism was inevitably tied up with the
rise of ever more efficient bureaucracies ..."192 As Weber wrote, "[t]he
development of modern forms of the organization in all fields is nothing
less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureau-
cratic administration." 19 3
As Talcott Parsons argued in his classic exposition of Weber's social
theory, a bureaucracy is
an organization devoted to what is from the point of view of the partici-
pants an impersonal end. It is based on a type of division of labor which
involves specialization in terms of clearly differentiated functions, di-
191. Id. at 84.
192. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Soci-
ology of Max Weber 57 (Oxford 1974).
193. Max Weber, Economy and Society 223 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Bedminster Press 1968). For a concise account of Weber's views on the significance of bu-
reaucratic organization in the modern capitalist economy, see Anthony Giddens, Capital-
ism and Modern Social Theory 158-160 (Cambridge U. Press 1971).
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vided according to technical criteria, with a corresponding division of
authority hierarchically organized, heading up to a central organ, and
specialized technical qualifications on the part of the participants. The
role of each participant is conceived of as an "office" where he acts by
virtue of the authority vested in the office and not of his personal
influence. 194
As Parsons notes, a key characteristic of bureaucracy is its imper-
sonality. In Weber's words, "[blureaucracy develops the more perfectly,
the more it is 'dehumanized,' the more completely it succeeds in elimi-
nating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irra-
tional, and emotional elements which escape calculation." 195
Summarizing Weber's view, Dean Kronman has written that
"[i]mpersonal rule... means that the bureaucrat's personal affairs - his
own interests and feelings - must be excluded, insofar as is humanly
possible, from the performance of his official duties; the ideal modern
officeholder is one who rules 'sine ira et studio, without anger or passion,
and hence without affection or enthusiasm'."19 6 One might say that the
bureaucrat in a modern business organization is expected to check his or
her personal distinguishing characteristics and interests - his or her PII
- at the company door.
Following Weber in this respect, 19 7 one could characterize the typi-
cal employee at Amazon.com as a bureaucrat seeking to achieve effi-
ciently the company's specified aims, e.g., to succeed in the market by
increasing revenue, profits, and/or share value. As an office holder in a
bureaucracy, the employee would be expected to deal with PII about cus-
tomers or potential customers impersonally, calculating the PII's value
for the corporation within the marketplace and making use of it accord-
ingly. The employee should have no personal interest in the PII or in
what it might tell us about particular persons. Thus, although an item of
PII in the hands of the employee remains "personal" in that it is about a
194. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action 506 (2d ed., Free Press 1949).
195. Max Weber, supra n.183, at 975; see also Robert K. Merton, Bureaucratic Structure
and Personality, in Social Theory and Social Structure 249, 256 (Free Press 1968).
196. Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber 65 (Stanford U. Press 1983), quoting Max Weber,
supra n. 183, at 225.
197. As MacIntyre points out, MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra n. 10, at 86, Weber is not
above criticism. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bu-
reaucratic Authority, in The Macintyre Reader 53, 64-67 (Kelvin Knight ed., U. Notre Dame
Press 1998). For an aggressive critique of Weber, see, Rodney Stark, Putting an End to
Ancestor Worship, 43 J. Sci. Stud. of Rel. 465, 465-68 (2004). It is beyond the scope of this
article to enter the debate about the continuing significance of Weber's work, but in that
connection, it is worth noting Professor Gorski's recent remark that "[e]ven today, Weber's
definition [of bureaucracy] still serves as the starting point for most work on the subject."
Philip S. Gorski, The Protestant Ethic and the Bureaucratic Revolution: Ascetic Protestant-
ism and Administrative Rationalization in Early Modern Europe, in Max Weber's Economy
and Society 267 (Charles Camic et al. eds., Stanford U. Press 2005).
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particular identifiable person, the employee should depersonalize the
item of PII by treating it merely as one more factor to be bought, used,
and/or sold in the pursuit of gain in the market. By treating each item of
PII as a factor in an impersonal market, the bureaucrat at Amazon.com
can channel and coordinate the potentially divergent interests of large
numbers of individuals, each with his or her own personal scheme(s) of
values, to achieve the corporate interests of Amazon.com itself. Any
other use of PII, specifically any use related to the personal characteris-
tics or interests of the employee, would be a misuse from the standpoint
of the bureaucracy.
The technology of modern electronic data processing and communi-
cations networks, including the Internet, complements and, in many
ways, perfects this bureaucratic tendency toward depersonalization of
PII by removing, or seeking to remove, the employee and his or her per-
sonal interests and concerns from the loop. Thus, although we continue
to speak as though a person called a Web site operator collects PII about
individuals for online companies such as Amazon.com, this language ar-
guably is no longer apt. At least in a "pure play"1 98 Internet-based busi-
ness, a machine called a web server collects a consumer's PII and
processes it through one or more networked computers according to a set
of rules laid down in the software that governs the network. Another set
of networked computers collects money from the consumer's bank or
credit-card account. Eventually, of course, a person may have to assist in
processing an order, perhaps by packing books or DVDs in a box, but
that person need have little or no access to a customer's PII. Thus, with
Internet technology, a company can buy, use, and possibly sell PIH in an
entirely impersonal manner for the impersonal economic benefit of the
company. In this respect, the Internet reflects and facilitates the imper-
sonal channeling and coordinating function of the corporate bureaucracy
under the post-Enlightenment paradigm.
Section 5 of the FTC Act and COPPA implicitly endorse the central
role of the bureaucratic business organization in the protection of infor-
mation privacy. They do so by encouraging or, under COPPA, requiring
each business organization operating a Web site to post a privacy policy
and thereby define the extent to which the organization will protect PII.
Section 5 and COPPA then require the business organization to abide by
that policy. This means, however, that the bureaucracy running the or-
ganization has almost unlimited authority to define the level of privacy
protection that a great many individuals - all users of the relevant Web
site - will share, and to define that level in a way that serves the imper-
198. Professors Mann and Winn define a "pure play" as an "Internet company that has
no off-line presence for dealing with its customers." Mann & Winn, supra n. 62, at 760.
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sonal objectives of the business organization itself.19 9 Each individual
can accept or reject the bureaucracy's "offer" of privacy protection by con-
senting or refusing to provide PII to the Web site. The corporate bureau-
cracy thus plays a central role in setting the price for PII in the properly
functioning market that Section 5 and COPPA protect and maintain. As
the post-Enlightenment paradigm requires, the bureaucracy thereby
channels diverse individual beliefs about the value of privacy into the
service of an impersonal order, an arrangement that is the hallmark of
bureaucratic individualism.
The importance of the impersonal bureaucrat under the U.S. In-
ternet privacy regime is not limited to his or her role as an office holder
in a business organization. The impersonal bureaucrat also plays a key
role in the policing model of regulation that supports the independent,
self-regulating market in which business organizations and individuals
trade PII. Under the U.S. Internet privacy regime, FTC officials, who
are clearly bureaucrats in Weber's and MacIntyre's sense of the term,
administer Section 5 of the FTC Act and COPPA. Their intervention in
the market to police overly aggressive behavior is tolerated and, indeed,
encouraged in part because it is understood to be impersonal in at least
two respects. First, FTC officials are expected to apply the law in a man-
ner that is not influenced by the personal identities or characteristics of
the regulated parties or of those individuals in the marketplace whom
the regulated parties allegedly harmed in violating the law. 20 0 Second,
and perhaps more importantly, FTC officials are expected to apply the
law not on the basis of their own personal identities and interests, their
own PII, but on the basis of their expertise in identifying overly aggres-
sive market behavior and policing such behavior under Section 5 of the
FTC Act and COPPA. In Weber's words,
[blureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for car-
rying through the principle of specializing administrative functions ac-
cording to purely objective considerations. Individual performances are
allocated to functionaries who have specialized training and who by con-
stant practice increase their expertise. 'Objective' discharge of business
primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules
and 'without regard for persons.' 20 1
As Reinhard Bendix observed, for Weber, bureaucratic "organiza-
tions operate more efficiently than alternative systems of administration
and ... they increase their efficiency to the extent that they 'depersonal-
199. The business organization enjoys somewhat less freedom under COPPA, which im-
poses some substantive restrictions on the types of privacy policies that Web site operators
may adopt if they wish to collection PII from children under 13. See supra Section 0).
200. The FTC does respond differently to an injured person if one item of PI about the
person comes to the FTC's attention, i.e., that the person is under the age of 13.
201. Max Weber, supra n. 183, at 975.
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ize' the execution of official tasks."20 2 Thus, an FTC official acting from
specialized knowledge of Section 5 and COPPA is expected to adopt an
impersonal stance that brackets out or subordinates his or her own PII
and that of the individuals under administrative scrutiny. In this re-
spect, applying administrative expertise to the market for PII entails de-
personalizing PII. However, applying administrative expertise to the
market for PII is necessary under the policing model, which presumes a
market for PII that is under threat and seeks to ensure through bureau-
cratic intervention that the market will continue to function autono-
mously. Thus, depersonalizing PII also seems to be necessary under the
policing model.
The policing model's reliance on the impersonal activity of the bu-
reaucrat points to another paradox or tension within the U.S. Internet
privacy regime. The bureaucrat achieves the ability to act impersonally
by bracketing out, or at least minimizing the influence of, his or her PII
and the PII of others on his or her behavior. In other words, the bureau-
crat is qua bureaucrat, a PII-less person for whom PII has no value or
significance, aside from that assigned to it by the rules that the bureau-
crat enforces. Each item of PII is one more value-free fact to be subjected
to the applicable rules. Indeed, to the bureaucrat, the values of individu-
als participating in the market are themselves simply facts, simply more
items of PII, to be subjected to the rules. Thus, a modern information-
privacy regime requires for its operation a type of public functionary or
official for whom P11 should have no personal significance, no personal
value, except as a means to the impersonal ends of the bureaucracy. 20 3
202. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber An Intellectual Portrait 427 (Anchor Books 1962).
203. Paul du Gay has criticized MacIntyre for misrepresenting Weber's bureaucrat as
an emotionless, soulless, instrumentally rational abstraction from a chimerical "integrated
moral personality..." Paul du Gay, In Praise of Bureaucracy 31 (Sage Publications 2000).
It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the accuracy of MacIntyre's interpretation
of Weber. Two points are, however, worth making in this context. First, du Gay's criticism
of MacIntyre appears to be based solely on du Gay's examination of one text - i.e., the first
edition of After Virtue. Thus, whatever the merits may be of du Gay's comments on the
latter, he is not a reliable expositor or critic of MacIntyre's broader position.
Second, the claims made in this article concerning the impersonal stance of the bureaucrat
for Weber and MacIntyre do not require a rejection of du Gay's thesis that bureaucrats
develop a distinctive "ethical demeanor." Id. Rather, this article argues that, in du Gay's
words, "[tihe ethical attributes of the good bureaucrat - strict adherence to procedures,
commitment to the purposes of the office and so forth," id. at 32, require the bureaucrat to
bracket out or subordinate as far as possible the personal attributes and interests, the PII,
that might influence him or her to make decisions that deviate from the requirements of
the rules of the office.
Moreover, there is no suggestion here that FTC officials actually succeed in bracketing out
their PII when performing official functions. This discussion relates to the ideal type of the
bureaucrat, not to actual bureaucrats who, like the rest of us, are simply trying to do their
jobs as best they can. For a discussion of "ideal types," see, e.g., Anthony Giddens, supra
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The privacy regime seeks to protect the personal, i.e., PII, by positing the
existence and activity of the purely impersonal, i.e., the official who em-
bodies only the expertise required to perform the duties of his or her of-
fice. Demands for personal privacy by individuals come to be seen as
demands for further intervention by the impersonal bureaucracy. Thus,
in this respect, the U.S. Internet privacy regime again reflects and rein-
forces a key tenet of the post-Enlightenment paradigm and promotes the
culture of bureaucratic individualism. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
what areas of personal life or experience might lie beyond the reach of
the post-Enlightenment paradigm if an area as allegedly important as
the privacy of our personal information can fit so tidily within the para-
digm and the culture it supports. Bureaucratic administration of the in-
dividual's PII in the market has come to seem "obvious," and this
obviousness renders other approaches increasingly unimaginable.
It is illuminating to contrast the radical depersonalization of PII in
the hands of impersonal bureaucracies (administrative or corporate)
with the highly personal nature of the authority that COPPA grants a
parent over his or her child's PII. Unlike the business organization,
which would be expected to view a child's PII as a factor to be purchased
and used in pursuit of the organization's business objectives, or the FTC,
which would be expected to view a child's PII as a commodity in a market
subject to impersonal application of policing rules set forth in COPPA,
the parent has the opportunity - and presumably the extra-legal justifi-
cation - to treat a child's PII in a highly personal manner as PII about
this particular child here who is "mine." The parent does not apply ob-
jective standards such as calculable rules without regard to persons.
Rather, the parent may treat - and typically is expected to treat - the
child as a unique person for whom the parent is uniquely responsible qua
parent. 20 4 If the parent were to treat the child's PII impersonally, the
parent would risk undercutting precisely the parental and familial nexus
that COPPA recognizes in granting the parent legal authority over the
child's PII. Of course, saying that a parent should not treat a child's PII
impersonally is not the same as saying how a parent should treat a
child's PII. An exposition of the virtues of parenting is, however, beyond
the scope of this Article. 20 5 Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that,
n.183, at 141-143; Talcott Parsons, Introduction, in Max Weber: The Theory of Social Action
3, 12-13 (ed. and trans. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Free Press, 1964).
204. COPPA specifically recognizes the unique relationship between the parent and his
or her child in the requirement that the Web site operator obtain verifiable parental con-
sent - i.e., obtain the opt-in consent of an adult who is verifiably the parent of the child
whose PIH the Web site operator wishes to collect. See supra n. 103-105 (and accompanying
text).
205. For a recent discussion of this large and very important topic, see MacIntyre, De-
pendent, supra n. 10, at 81-98.
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insofar as we appeal to a measure such as the "good parent" in discussing
a parent's highly personal responsibilities, we may find that we have re-
lied at least implicitly upon a version of the old teleological paradigm
that seems to lurk in the shadows cast by the post-Enlightenment para-
digm's manner of illuminating experience. Perhaps, only from the per-
spective of a shared vision of what a good parent is, what a good family
is, and what a good community of families is, can one hope to advise a
parent of what he or she should allow (or not allow) with respect to a
child's PII. And from the perspective of such a shared vision, we might
be able to do away with - or at least imagine a limit to the sway of - the
post-Enlightenment paradigm, which presumes that an impersonal bu-
reaucrat is needed to channel the behavior of sovereign individuals con-
fronting a value-free world.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article began by constructing a new theoretical framework
from the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre on the failure of post-Enlighten-
ment thinkers to produce an account of human nature and action that
could replace an older Aristotelian account and command the assent of
all rational persons. Applying the new theoretical framework to the U.S.
regime governing information privacy on the Internet, this Article has
shown how and why that regime reflects and reinforces three key ele-
ments of the "post-Enlightenment paradigm," i.e., the sovereign individ-
ual, the market, and the administrative bureaucracy. The U.S. regime
emerges from, and helps to maintain, a world in which the individual's
power to construct an identity increasingly depends on his or her ability
to consent to the sale of personal information to an impersonal corporate
bureaucracy in a properly functioning market under the regulatory su-
pervision of an impersonal government bureaucracy.
This Article also has shown that the U.S. Internet privacy regime
reflects some of the limits and problems of the post-Enlightenment para-
digm. In particular, this Article has shown that the U.S. regime appears
to recognize at its margins the possibility that people may be more than
simply sovereign individuals choosing their private values, and that
their efforts to identify and pursue a shared vision of the good may re-
quire a different understanding of the significance of personal informa-
tion from that found in the U.S. regime. Moreover, this Article has
shown that the U.S. regime "protects" personal information by treating
such information as an impersonal commodity in the market and by plac-
ing the information under the supervision of bureaucratic officials who
are themselves expected to act and think impersonally. The impersonal
thus becomes a precondition of the personal, and action by an impersonal
bureaucracy becomes a precondition of the individual's identity. Para-
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doxically, in the era that Maclntyre labels "bureaucratic individualism,"
each new assertion of individual control over personal information en-
hances bureaucratic power.
In addition to providing a new perspective on the U.S. Internet pri-
vacy regime, an underlying objective of this Article has been to illustrate
the potential usefulness of the post-Enlightenment paradigm as part of a
new theoretical framework for examining legal problems. Assuming that
this objective has been achieved with respect to the particular legal re-
gime discussed here, at least two questions immediately arise. First, is
the theoretical framework robust enough to be applied more broadly?
For example, if the post-Enlightenment paradigm reflects the way that
thoughtful 21st Century people in general have learned to understand
their world, it should be possible to find traces of the paradigm operating
in other Internet privacy regimes that appear to differ from the U.S. re-
gime. This possibility will be explored in a future article on the Euro-
pean Union's regime for protecting information privacy on the Internet.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the European Union's regime
does reflect and reinforce the post-Enlightenment paradigm, this conclu-
sion would lend support to the suggestion made at the outset of this Arti-
cle that the paradigm limits our ability to imagine genuine alternatives
to the existing approach(es) to information privacy.
Second, as noted in Section I supra, identifying a paradigm is not the
same thing as freeing oneself from that paradigm or supplying an alter-
native to it. Recognizing that the U.S. approach to Internet privacy is
dominated by notions of the sovereign individual, the market, and the
administrative bureaucracy is not the same thing as providing an alter-
native account of Internet privacy or persuading anyone to accept that
account. As noted above,20 6 MacIntyre has argued in a number of con-
texts that an updated Aristotelian approach to the problems of human
nature and moral action will provide the best alternative to the approach
embodied in what I have called the post-Enlightenment paradigm. A fu-
ture article will examine Maclntyre's claims in this regard and seek to
determine whether his extensive discussions of Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas provide the only or the best way forward. A key question will be
whether MacIntyre provides a genuine alternative to the post-Enlighten-
ment paradigm or just another example of a post-Enlightenment individ-
ual spelling out his personal values and then selling them in the market.
206. See supra n. 8 and accompanying text.
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